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Abstract
This thesis investigates three theoretical problems in executive compensar 
tion literature. They involve extension of a standard principal-agent model, 
incorporating taxation into the valuation of executive stock options, and 
the pricing of executive stock options in the presence of managerial effort.
Empirical literature has long addressed the endogeneity of capital structure 
and executive compensation. Yet few models, which optimally determine 
executive compensation, explicitly introduce capital structure choice. Chap­
ter 2 proposes a principal-agent model in wMcli the capital structure, com­
pensation and managerial actions are simultaneously determined. Based on 
our numerical results leverage has two effects on managerial actions. One 
is to discipline the manager and the other is to replace the incentive effect 
of compensation. Two such effects exist because volatility is chosen by the 
manager.
The basic model is also extended to include debt-like compensation. Our 
results show that for a given leverage level rewarding the manager with debt 
makes her work harder but take less risk. But. debt, compensation cannot 
limit risk neutral shareholders’ risk appetite; we hence conclude that only a 
combination of capital and pay regulation, which restricts both risk-taking 
of shareholders and incentives of the manager, can significantly reduce the 
firm’s risk.
Taxation is an important consideration in the design of executive (and em­
ployee) compensation. It directly affects the firm’s revenue as well as the 
executive’s after tax income. Once the compensation is granted, taxes also 
affect the early exercise strategy of the components of the compensation. 
Chapter 3 explores the executive (and employees) compensation with tax. 
Specifically, we build a tax-inclusive valuation model. The new feature of
the model is an addition of a tax decision, which allows the executive (and 
employees) to optimally sell stock to maximize after-tax terminal utility. 
The stock selling decision is very similar to an option exercise decision. The 
valuation model essentially has two embedded options: one option is when 
to exercise the stock option and the other option is when to sell the stock.
This new feature allows different exercise policies for executive stock options 
under different tax schemes. We apply the model to the US and the UK tax 
system. The findings suggest that restricted stock is the preferred form of 
compensation in the US. In the UK, restricted stock is only preferred when 
the executive has low wealth. We also investigate incentives of a special 
tax scheme -  section 83b election -  which gives employees a choice to pay 
income tax at grant date. This voluntary election allows the executive to 
accelerate tax on restricted stock. Our results suggest that 83b election is 
not optimal for the manager, who would get double-taxed. And it is not 
optimal for the issuing firm either, as restricted stock without the election 
can provide higher incentives at lower cost.
The value of executive stock options (ESOs) should depend on the man­
ager’s ability to influence firm value. ESOs are granted under the assump­
tion that the executive could make the firm value increase. However, ESOs 
are always valued with no managerial influence. Chapter 4 examines val­
uation of ESOs, with the assumption that the manager can influence the 
firm value via her effort choice. The manager influences stock prices by ex­
erting effort, which increases the firm’s stock expected return. Effort leads 
to a disutility (which can be regarded as effort cost) to the risk-averse, 
utility-maximizing manager. In addition to the effort choice, the market 
asset is also introduced to the manager’s investment set. Effort increases 
the manager’s subjective valuation as well as the cost of ESO.
The standard principal-agent model is not strictly speaking consistent with 
general equilibrium models like CAPM. Managerial effort is generally not 
priced under these equilibrium models, because all managers are price- 
takers. For this reason, we assume that CAPM does not strictly hold when 
effort is introduced. Our results show that the manager’s value and the
cost increase with the correlation, because the manager delays a value de­
stroying early exercise. We also show that the manager’s subjective value 
of the ESO is higher than the cost only when the manager has low wealth, 
low risk-aversion, and the stock has a low volatility. Under these scenarios, 
the manager’s marginal utility is high and effort has a large impact on the 
manager’s valuation. As a result, the value is higher than the cost. These 
results suggest that managers of large public firms are less likely to value 
their ESOs higher than the cost; while managers of small non-public firms 
are likely to value their ESOs far higher than their cost. The result may 
explain why ESO is so popular in small startup firms, where ESO is most 
likely to be valued higher than the cost.
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Executive compensation has been a multifaceted and controversial subject over the 
last three decades. The financial crisis of 2007 and the subsequent government bailout 
of major investment banks have raised a lot of controversy about current executive 
compensation practices. Banks receiving bailout funds have kept paying substantial 
bonuses to their executives.1 Although public anger over top executives’ pay resulted 
in some reforms of compensation practices and brought more restrictions 011 pay, it 
is not the first time the pay controversy has arisen.2 In fact, executive compensation 
has been a heatedly researched area for the past decade. Existing work has uncovered 
many insights that significantly improve our understanding of executive compensation. 
Still, a consistent theory that captures observed practice is yet to be developed. A lot 
of work has to be done for better theories to emerge. This thesis is one of the works 
that attempts to move this process forward.
The main purpose of the thesis is to address three theoretical problems in executive 
compensation3, which relate to three streams of literature: the principal-agent model, 
taxation and valuation of executive stock options (ESO). All of this literature has 
been extensively discussed and debated over the past three decades. Yet there are still 
questions left unanswered. In the following sections of this chapter, each stream of
1 Conyon et al. [2011] document all these ‘public anger’ incidents in the US, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK.
2Wells [2010] provides an excellent review of executive com pensation in the 1930s. During the  
Depression-era, top CEO s’ pay also sparked huge public outrage.
3 Executive compensation is a topic that spans different disciplinary areas. For example, Devers 
et al. [2007] provide a comprehensive review of executive com pensation across different subject areas -  
m anagem ent, finance, accounting, economics and psychology.
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1. INTRODUCTION
literature is reviewed. As a preview of detailed analysis in the following three chapters, 
problems and unanswered questions in each stream are also discussed.
1.1 Principal-agent model
One major theoretical stream of executive compensation relates to the principal-agent 
problem (or agency theory), which stems from Ross [1973], Mirrlees [1976] and Holm- 
strom [1979]. The basic structure of these models is relatively simple, which usually 
involves two parties: a principal and an agent. The agent privately takes an action a 
that impacts on the payoff r(a ,0 ), which is a function of the action a and a random 
component 9\ 9 is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. The 
agency problem is to determine how the payoff' x(a,9)  should be shared optimally be­
tween the two parties. Assuming the principal is risk neutral and the agent has utility 
function H(x,  a), the principal’s objective is to maximize expected payoff net payment 
to the agent,
max E ( x  — s(x)) (1.1)
«(*)
subject to,
E[H(s(x),a)] > H  (1.2)
a G argm ax£'[i7(s(x), a)] (1.3)
a
where s(x) is the contract paid to the agent, and H  is minimum expected utility for 
the agent to undertake the task. Condition (1.2) is the participation constraint, which 
guarantees the agent a minimum expected utility. Condition (1.3) is the incentive 
compatibility constraint, which ensures that the optimal contract leads to the best 
action. A convenient feature of the agency problem is that it can easily be applied 
to any principal-agent relationship. Jensen and Meckling [1976] integrate the agency 
problem to the theory of the firm, and show that an agency problem exists between 
shareholder and debtholder in the form of overinvestment.
A large body of literature has accumulated since then studying the agency problem
associated with firms, especially the relationship between shareholder and manager.
In fact, the contract design is the most prominent application of the principal-agent
2
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model. The model can be easily changed to accommodate equity-based compensation, 
which has been the most popular compensation instrument in the past three decades. 
A typical approach of modifying the standard model outlined above is to impose a 
functional form on the contract pay, so that
where b is the proportion of the payoff, x, the principal pays to the agent, which rep­
resents the stock of the firm. Constant c represents the agent’s fixed wage. With some 
simplification, such a contract space can resemble a typical managerial compensation; 
in practice, managers also get bonuses, stock options, pension benefits and other in­
centive schemes. We only assume the stock and wage here to preserve linearity of the 
contract payoff, which allows for a tractable solution. The problem boils down to ob­
taining the optimal mix of b and c that maximizes the shareholder’s value. To simplify 
the analysis, assume
The agent’s utility function, H(s(x) ,a)  is exponential and effort averse, a is the mag­
nitude of the payoff risk. R  is the agent’s risk-aversion coefficient. Since the payoff is 
normally distributed and the agent’s utility function H(s(x) ,a)  is exponential, rnean- 
variance preference is used for expected utility. So
Now the principal’s problem can be expressed in terms of b alone. His maximization
s(x) = bx +  c (1.4)
x(a, 9) — a + u9
(1.5)
r -| 1 1  
E  H(s(x) ,a )j =ab + c -  - a 2 -  i ^ a 2 ( 1 .6 )
Based on the first order condition of equation (1.3),
a = b (1.7)
From the agent’s participation constraint, the constant, c, is given by




max E( x  -  s(x)) = £ [ ( !  -  b)a +  (1 -  b)a6 -  c]
s(x)
= b -  H  — - R b 2a 2 -  - b 2 
2 2
The first order condition with respect to b gives,
h = T V R ^  (L1°)
W ith some algebra arrangement, the complete solution is standard in the principal- 
agent literature,
1   R b 2 a 2 —  1
a = b ' b =  1 +  R o 2 ’ ° =  H  + 2(1 +  A t 2) ’
The agent’s performance based on expected payoff to the principal is,
p  =  ^ - sw ]  =  2( r T ^ - f f 4 a - ¥  ( U 2 )
Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987] have a continuous version of the above solution. Guo 
and Ou-Yang [2006] have a one-period solution similar to the one present here. There
are two testable implications: the first one is that both effort a, and incentives (or
pay-for-performance) 6, are good predictors of the firm’s performance; The second one 
is a negative relationship between incentives, b and exogenous risk, cr.
The simple structure and linear contracts of the standard model make solving the 
agency problem relatively easy.4 Many studies build variations of the standard model 
to obtain testable implications. These studies mostly investigate relationship between 
variables in the model, e.g. between pay-for-performance and risk, pay-for-performance 
and firm performance, etc. Jin [2002] extends the basic model and allows the manager 
(agent) to trade the market asset. His model predicts that pay-performance sensitivity 
decreases with the firm-specific risk, and does not change with the market risk. These 
results are consistent with his empirical findings. Bitler et al. [2005] develop a principal- 
agent model that predicts the standard implications, which are pay-performance sen-
'M ean variance preferences, as shown in equation (1.6), are also needed to linearize expected utility.
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sitivity decreasing with firm risk and increasing with firm performance. They find 
empirical support for these predictions using entrepreneurial data. Gao [2010] builds a 
principal-agent model with managerial hedging. Ilis model shows that pay-performance 
sensitivity decreases with the agent’s hedging cost. Empirically, he finds evidence sup­
porting this prediction. Apart from the linear contracts used in many empirical studies, 
other works explore the convexity in executive compensation as equity-based pay is non­
linear financial instruments. Innes [1990] solves a principal-agent model where agents 
have limited liability. Hemmer et al. [1999] investigate convexity in a principal-agent 
model. They show that convexity is introduced when agents have moderate levels of 
relative risk aversion.
Although the standard model has a tractable solution, its linearity makes applica­
tion of the model to stock options difficult. Stock options are non-linear, convex in­
struments, which naturally make the model non-linear when included. Models, which 
include stock options, usually have less tractable solutions. However, inclusion of stock 
options in the principal-agent model can investigate a very important question: W hat 
is the optimal mix of compensation: stock or options? A problem that has puzzled 
the literature for decades and attracted widespread academic debate. Studies on this 
issue are many. Feltham and Wu [2001] build a principal-agent model to compare the 
incentive cost of stock and options. They show that options have less incentive cost 
when the agent can shift payoff risk, which suggests options are the optimal form of 
compensation. In an influential paper, Hall and Murphy [2002] reviewed the problem 
based on the certainty equivalent approach. Their investigation suggests that stock is 
the most efficient form of compensation. While empirical evidence provides little sup­
port for these results, they carefully interpret that a puzzle may exist, and suggest that 
more robust treatment would follow a principal-agent framework similar to Grossman 
and Hart [1983].
Their results (Hall and Murphy [2002]) lead to a series of calibration models that 
match principal-agent models to observed data. Armstrong et al. [2007] calibrate a 
principal-agent model to a dataset of Fortune 500 companies. They find that stock 
options are always part of the optimal contract. Dittmann and Maug [2007] calibrate a 
standard principal-agent model using US executive compensation data. However, they 
find stock is the optimal form of executive compensation and options should never be
1. INTRODUCTION
rewarded. Hence, they conclude that the standard principal-agent model typically used 
in the literature cannot explain observed compensation contracts.
Kadan and Swinkels [2008] introduce bankruptcy risk into the principal-agent model 
to investigate the optimal form of compensation. They empirically find that stock is 
only optimal when firms have a high probability of bankruptcy. Palmon et al. [2008] 
build a principal-agent model with stock, options and the agent having a limited li­
ability. They show that options are the optimal form of compensation. They also 
investigate the optimal strike price of option and find that without taxation a slightly 
out-of-money option is the optimal compensation instrument. The studies mentioned 
above have mixed conclusions regarding the optimal form of compensation. It seems 
variations of the principal-agent model can lead to quite different results. This prob­
lem is still open to debate. In Chapter 3, we also investigate the optimal form of 
compensation using our valuation model.
Another problem that has attract recent attention is inside debt5, such as pensions 
and deferred compensation, which constitutes a large form of executive compensation 
and has significant impact on executives’ incentives. Prior literature solely considers 
equity (stock) based compensation mainly because of limited disclosure. Sundaram and 
Yermack [2007] show that inside debt has an impact on the firm’s cost of debt and its 
capital structure. Edmans and Liu [2011] introduce inside debt into a principal-agent 
model, which involve changing the payoff function equation (1.4). They show inside 
debt is more effective than bonuses at curbing the overinvestment problem. Principal- 
agent models that incorporate inside-debt are rare. Debt compensation adds extra 
complexity to the ‘stock or option’ debate. The effect of inside debt is also considered 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
An interesting strand of studies calibrate the principal-agent model to observed 
data in order to examine efficiency of observed contracts. Dittmann et al. [2010] argue 
that managers are loss-averse and a principal-agent model with loss-averse agents can 
explain observed data remarkably well. Edmans et al. [2009] reformulate the original 
principal-agent model by introducing a multiplicative effort and calibrate the model to 
empirical contracts. Their model captures some features of observed data, so they con­
clude that the empirically observed compensation data actually reflects efficiency and
5T his term was first coined in Jensen and Meckling [1976] to refer to com pensation securities with 
payoffs similar to debt.
6
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are consistent with their new model. More recently, Dittmann et al. [2011] calibrated 
a principal-agent model to demonstrate the unintended consequences of restriction on 
executive compensation. They show that rather than reducing risk-taking incentives, 
restriction on some components of compensation can lead to higher risk-taking incen­
tives.
Finally, a small number of studies extend principal-agent models by endogenizing 
the risk choice, e.g. Cadenillas et al. [2004], Guo and Ou-Yang [2006] and Carlson and 
Lazrak [2010]. Since this is a major topic of Chapter 2, we reserve discussion of these 
papers for the next chapter.
1.2 Pricing and taxation of ESO
Another important strand of literature in executive compensation is the valuation of 
executive stock options (ESOs), which can be traced back to the option pricing theory 
of Black and Scholes [1973], Merton [1973] and Cox et al. [1979]. ESOs are Ameri­
can call options, which are typically granted to executives at the money as a form of 
compensation. However, once the options are granted, the executives cannot exercise 
it until a vesting period, which typically lasting 1-5 years, has passed. ESOs also have 
a long maturity, usually lasting about 10 years. ESOs differ from standard options 
in that they are not traded and holders can not sell the underlying stock to hedge 
their options exposure. Valuation of ESOs is essentially an incomplete market pricing 
problem, where a unique price is not available. Due to this reason, the standard Black- 
Scholes-Merton framework is not easily applicable to the problem. There is no generally 
accepted theory that can objectively price options under an incomplete market setting. 
In addition to the incompleteness, ESOs (in practice) are usually exercised differently 
than those of a standard option because of executives’ personal wealth, risk aversion 
and ability to manage the firm. Firms also reset strike prices of granted options, a 
practice called repricing, when ESO goes too far out-of-the money. Due to these added 
complexities, ESO valuation attracts increasing academic attention.
The utility based (or so called certainty equivalent) approach is one of the most 
used valuation methods in the literature, as it provides a unique price for a given 
utility function. A certainty equivalent price is the riskless amount of cash that makes 
the manager’s utility indifferent between accepting ESOs and taking the riskless cash.
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In other words, utilities provided by the riskless cash and ESOs are equal. For this 
reason, this approach is also called utility indifference pricing. An advantage of this 
approach is that it incorporates the manager’s subjective risk aversion parameter into 
the ESO price. Its major disadvantage is that explicit solutions are only available in 
some special cases, which may be already discussed in the literature (e.g. Henderson 
and Hobson [2009b]).
For a simple example, assume the manager’s utility function without the ESO po­
sition is U(w, t), where w is the manager’s wealth and t represents time. When the 
manager has an ESO, her valuation function follows J(w,s , t ) .  The valuation function 
normally depends on the manager’s wealth, risk aversion, and investment choice, where 
s is the stock price underlying the ESO. The certainty equivalent amount, C, is the 
cash amount that makes the utility from these two sources equal. It should satisfy the 
following relationship,
U(w + CA) = J(w,s , t )  (1.13)
The left side of the equation has no risk, both w and C  are certain at time t. So the 
certainty equivalent amount, C is
C = U - 1[J{w,si t),t] - w  (1.14)
It is intuitively easy to understand the basics of this approach. The difficult part, how­
ever, is finding the value function, J(w, s,t). Various numerical schemes are proposed 
in the literature to find the value function.
Lambert et al. [1991] are among the first to use the certainty equivalent approach to 
price ESOs. They compute the ESO value based on a single-period model, and find that 
the executive’s subjective valuation is far lower than the market price (or option cost). 
Huddart [1994] and Kulatilaka and Marcus [1994] develop binomial tree models in a 
utility framework to compute certainty equivalents. With no market asset they assume 
that outside wealth is invested in the risk free asset. Detemple and Sundaresan [1999] 
solve the utility maximization in the presence of the market asset using a binomial 
model. In a continuous time framework, Henderson [2005] solves the portfolio choice 
problem with non-option assets optimally allocated between riskless and market assets. 
Carpenter et al. [2010] provide a comprehensive study of optimal exercise policy based 
on the utility maximizing, portfolio choice problem.
1.2 Pricing and taxation of ESO
In the thesis, the certainty equivalent approach is used as the valuation method. 
Both Chapter 3 and 4 use a variation of certainty equivalent approach, assuming power 
law utility function, to value ESOs.6
Although pricing of ESOs in the utility framework has been extensively explored, 
there are very few studies that incorporate the certainty equivalent approach into the 
principal-agent model to price ESO. The problem lies in the fact that there is no 
unified general asset pricing model to accommodate features from both streams of 
literature. Ramakrishnan and Thakor [1984] attempt to incorporate moral hazard 
into a single-period asset pricing model. They argue that stock valuation should not 
be exogenous to the ownership structure of the firm, and moral hazard affects asset 
returns through unobservable managerial actions. They theorize that managerial effort 
is an unobservable pricing factor of the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross [1976]. Ou- 
Yang [2005] builds a continuous time asset pricing model with moral hazard. He shows 
under a principal-agent framework that asset returns still follow a modified CAPM 
relation. Managerial effort in his model is not a pricing factor, it affects asset price 
return through influence on systematic risk.
Taxation also plays a major role in the compensation literature. It directly deter­
mines which compensation instruments should be used, and when they should be used. 
This layer of complexity arises because ESOs differ by tax definition. For example, 
the most prominent ESOs in the US are incentive stock options and unqualified stock 
options, which have exactly the same option-styled feature. They only differ in tax 
terms which affect both income to the manager and cost to the firm. This difference in 
taxation actually has a pricing impact as it affects how the manager and the firm value 
ESOs. There are many studies that explore the taxation impact of ESO. For example, 
Babenko and Tserlukevich [2009] find that ESOs tend to be exercised when firms have 
high taxable income (exercise of ESOs leads to a tax deduction on corporate taxable 
income in the same tax year), so that granting options can save large US companies an
6Apart from the utility based approach, risk neutral valuation is also popular for its tractability. For 
exam ple, Sircar and Xiong [2007] provide an analytical and flexible valuation framework, in a com plete  
market setting, by assuming executives are risk neutral. Their model also considers resetting and 
reloading features of ESOs, which are quite difficult to implement in a utility based model. Cvitanic  
et al. [2008] explore the valuation problem considering ESO early exercise and job term ination. In 
addition, the Statem ent of Accounting Standard 123(11), which is issued by the Financial Accounting  
Standard Board (FASB), also requires that firms value options according to “established principles of 
financial economic theory” , which include two methods (lattice and modified Black-Scholes m ethods) 
for ESO valuations. Both methods are variations of risk neutral models.
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average $12.6 million every year. Graham et al. [2004] find that option deductions lead 
to large aggregate tax savings for US firms. Conventional option pricing theory does 
not consider taxation by assuming managers and firms are tax neutral (which means 
income and expense of different types have no impact on taxation). In Chapter 3, this 
assumption is relaxed and options are valued with a tax inclusive model.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
The thesis consists of the introduction followed by three chapters. In Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4, three different compensation problems are analyzed.
In Chapter 2 we develop a principal-agent model where compensation and capital 
structure decisions are made simultaneously. Specially, we consider a risk-averse man­
ager whose compensation consists of stock and fixed wages. The manager optimally 
chooses the level of effort and volatility to maximize her terminal expected utility. Her 
action has a direct impact on the company value: effort choice influences mean of the 
firm’s return, volatility choice impacts firm’s risk. The manager incurs cost by exert­
ing different actions; we assume that the cost of managerial action is convex in both 
effort and volatility. Different from the literature on risk shifting, we assume that it is 
both costly to increase and decrease volatility. Without managerial action, the firm’s 
volatility stays at its normal level, therefore it is costly to change the firm’s risk from 
its normal level, either increasing or decreasing it. The compensation contract, which 
consists of stock and fixed wage, is determined by the shareholders whose objective is 
to maximize the expected equity value net any payment to the manager. Agency cost 
arises because the manager is risk averse and may not choose actions that are in the 
best interests of shareholders. We estimate the agency costs between the manager and 
shareholders by comparing the first-best and the second-best solution. Under such a 
setting, we show that leverage has two effects on managerial action. One is to discipline 
for managerial effort and the other is to substitute for compensation incentives. Such 
a distinction exists because volatility is endogenous. We also extend the conventional 
principal-agent model to include debt-like compensation. Our results show that for 
a given leverage level, rewarding the manager with debt makes her choose higher ef­
fort and lower volatility. Since debt compensation does not reduce the risk appetite 
of shareholders, we hence conclude it is a combination of capital and pay regulation
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which limits both risk-taking of shareholders and incentives of the manager that can 
significantly reduce excessive risk-taking.
Chapter 3 contains an analysis of executive (and employees) compensation with 
tax. We introduce tax decisions, which involve the executive (and employees) optimally 
selling stock to maximize after-tax terminal utility, into the conventional option pricing 
model. Stock selling decisions are similar to option exercise decisions. The valuation 
model essentially has two embedded options, which allow different exercise behaviour 
for ESOs under different tax schemes. We then analyze whether the tax treatment 
could explain the widespread use of stock options for employees and executives across 
different countries. The findings support recent literature that restricted stock is a 
preferred form of compensation in the US. We also apply the model to a particular 
tax scheme -  section 83b election. This election is only available to restricted stock 
to accelerate tax payment. Without this election, restricted stock is only taxed when 
vested (but not taxed when first granted) and at the income tax rate. Subsequent sale 
of stock is then taxed at a capital gain tax rate. If the manager elects 83b, then she 
is taxed at income tax rate when stocks are granted. Vesting does not incur any tax, 
but subsequent sale of stock is taxed at capital gain rate. Our results suggest that 83b 
election is neither optimal for the manager nor the issuing firm. Because it double-taxes 
the manager and results in low incentives, it is a very costly instrument to incentivize 
managers.
Chapter 4 considers the problem of the pricing ESOs with managerial effort. The 
model is an extension of Henderson [2005], Henderson [2007] and Carpenter et al. [2010]. 
Effort increases the firm’s stock expected return, but is associated with a disutility 
to the risk-averse, utility-maximizing manager. The manager optimally exerts effort 
and exercises ESOs. In addition to effort choice, the manager can trade the market 
asset which is used as a partial hedge of the ESO position. Effort is included in 
the manager’s valuation because she has private information about its value. Effort 
influences ESO cost only through exercise decisions but not directly through its impact 
on the stock price return. Because the cost is computed based on complete market 
dynamic hedging, all securities are priced at riskless rate. Conventional principal-agent 
models are mostly partial hence are not consistent with general equilibrium models like 
CAPM and managerial effort generally is not priced under these equilibrium models. 
For this reason, we adopt similar assumption to Ou-Yang [2005] that effort is not a
11
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priced factor, and CAPM does not strictly hold. Similar to a traded option, our results 
show that the manager’s valuation increases with correlation. ESO cost also increases 
with correlation as the manager delays value destroying early exercise. We also show 
that the manager’s subjective value of ESO is higher than cost when the manager has 
low wealth, low risk-aversion, and stock has a low volatility. Under these scenarios, the 
manager’s marginal utility is high and effort has a significant impact on the manager’s 
valuation, so that values are higher than cost. These results suggest that managers from 
large public firms are less likely to value their ESOs higher than cost; and managers of 
small non-public firms are likely to value their ESOs far higher than cost.




Risk-Taking and Capital 
Structure Choice
2.1 Introduction
Stock-based compensation has become an ever more important component of a man­
ager’s remuneration package. Hall and Murphy [2002] report that stock options ac­
counted for over 40% of the total pay of the S&P 500 CEOs. As executive compensation 
raises some controversy, in particular during and in the aftermath of the recent credit 
crisis, a better understanding of managerial incentives induced by stock-based compen­
sation seems crucial. While there is a large body of literature focusing on either how 
CEO compensation structure determines firm characteristics (e.g. Jin [2 0 0 2 ]) or on the 
reverse problem, that is, how firm characteristics affect compensation structure (e.g. 
Coles et al. [2006], Brockman et al. [2010]), relatively little is known about the joint 
determination of the firm’s operating strategy and its compensation structure. The 
objective of this chapter is to investigate the interaction between managerial incentives 
and firm characteristics. Specifically, we examine the effect of debt on the design of 
contracts and its impact on the manager’s risk-taking behaviour.
Recent empirical literature suggests that compensation contracts and financing poli­
cies are jointly determined, yet to the best of our knowledge very few theoretical contri­
butions have endogenized the capital structure choice in the evaluation of compensation
13
2. INCENTIVES, MANAGERIAL RISK-TAKING AND CAPITAL
STRUCTURE CHOICE
contracts. Most studies treat financing and compensation decisions as independent, e.g. 
D ittm ann and Maug [2007]. Notable exceptions are Cadenillas et al. [2004] and Carl­
son and Lazrak [2010]; both endogenize leverage and managerial actions. Still, they do 
not investigate the interaction between incentives and debt choice7, which is exactly 
the focus of this chapter. We endogenize firm debt choice and compensation contracts, 
and determine both simultaneously as suggested in the empirical literature (e.g. Ortiz- 
Molina [2007]). Debt choice is important in determining the compensation contract 
because shareholders5 return depends on debt which magnifies the m anagers action 
choices. The managers action, on the other hand, depends on shareholders’ choice of 
compensation contract. So firm debt level, compensation and managerial risk-taking 
are simultaneously determined.
Specifically, we consider a risk-averse manager whose compensation consists of the 
firm’s stock and a fixed wage. The manager chooses the level of effort and volatility to 
maximize the expected utility of her terminal wealth. Her action has a direct impact on 
the company value: the effort choice influences the mean of the firm’s return, whereas 
the volatility choice impacts the firm’s risk. The manager incurs a cost by exerting 
different actions and we assume that the cost of managerial action is convex in both 
effort and volatility. Unlike other contributions to the literature on risk shifting, we 
allow for a strictly positive cost of both an increase and a reduction of volatility. Without 
managerial action, the firm’s volatility stays at its “normal” level (so it is costly to 
change the firm’s risk from that level). Shareholders determine compensation contract; 
their objective is to maximize the expected equity value net of any payment to the 
manager. The agency cost arises because the manager is risk averse and may not 
choose actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.
Confirming prior studies, our results show that leverage has a. similar impact to com­
pensation incentives on inducing managerial effort and risk-taking. Therefore, leverage 
is a good substitute for incentives. Our results also show that the leverage-incentive 
relation is mixed, even in a very simple setup where debt is used to increase the size of 
the firm’s assets. The leverage-incentive relationship is negative when volatility cost is 
low. This result has some empirical support e.g. Rajan and Zingales [1995] and Guay
7In Cadenillas et al. [2004] stock has no incentive effect; it is merely used to retain the manager. 
Carlson and Lazrak [2010] treat compensation as an exogenous choice.
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[1999]. However, the relationship is positive when the volatility cost is high. This result 
is consistent with Lewellen [2006].
Another question we try to answer in this chapter is whether the design of the 
compensation package can mitigate managers’ excessive risk-taking. This is a problem 
that is particularly important for the financial industry, where a debt-to-equity ratio 
of 20:1 is not uncommon among investment banks. Academic literature has offered 
a way of alleviating this problem -  rewarding the manager with debt-like compensa­
tion, e.g. Sundaram and Yermack [2007] and Edmans and Liu [2011]. We extend 
the conventional principal-agent model to include debt-like compensation. Our results 
show that rewarding debt to the manager makes her work harder and take less risk. 
And leverage has a strictly negative relation with managerial risk-taking. Still, debt 
compensation results in an even higher leverage choice. Because rewarding debt-like 
compensation only mitigates managerial risk-taking, it by no means reduces sharehold­
ers’ risk appetite. Unless there is a mechanism to mitigate risk-seeking behaviour of 
shareholders, designation of compensation contracts is unlikely to achieve systematic 
leverage reduction.
The paper closest to ours is Cadenillas et al. [2004] which implements a continuous 
time model for volatility and effort choice. Our one period model is complementary to 
theirs with managerial volatility choice. Our model is also similar to Palmon et al. [2008] 
who introduce limited liability to the shareholders’ problem and solve the non-linear 
programme using simulation. Our model is also an extension of Guo and Ou-Yang 
[2006] with the leverage choice. Because of its rich setting, our model captures many 
existing features that are well established in the literature. First, our results show that 
the incentive-performance relationship is not always as straightforward as suggested 
by the simple principal-agent model. Second, the incentive-risk relation is not always 
negative as suggested in the literature, as low volatility cost and high leverage actu­
ally encourage risk-taking, which implies a positive incentive-risk relationship. Third, 
confirming the mixed incentive-leverage relationship observed in the literature (e.g. 
Florackis and Ozkan [2009] show that the incentive-leverage relationship is not mono­
tonic), we demonstrate that whether incentives and leverage are positively or negatively 
related depends on the manager’s risk aversion, skills and the company characteristics. 
Fourth, we show that debt is an alternative alignment device used to induce managerial 
action and manage the firm’s overall risk.
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Our findings come from considering in the model additional choice variables, namely 
endogenous volatility and leverage. To summarize, our contributions to the literature 
are as follows: Firstly, in contrast to Edmans and Liu [2011], where they argue that 
rewarding with debt can reduce risk-shifting, our results show that debt compensation 
does not reduce firm risk. This is because debt is endogenous in our model. Even 
though, for a given leverage level, rewarding with debt makes the manager work harder 
and take less risk (this is in line with Edmans and Liu [2011]). Shareholders can change 
leverage levels to offset the manager’s risk-reducing choice. The net result is that the 
firm takes high risk by employing large leverage. In fact, observed leverage level could 
be even higher if not exogenously constrained (e.g. by bank capital requirement). 
Since debt-like compensation does not reduce the risk-taking appetite of shareholders, 
one could question the effectiveness of deferred compensation (which is essentially a 
debt-like compensation) at curbing excessive risk-taking.
Secondly, we clearly identify two effects of leverage on managerial actions. One 
is the disciplinary effect for managerial effort; the other is substitution for incentives. 
Such a distinction exists because volatility is endogenous. When volatility choice is not 
available to the manager, leverage strictly increases managerial effort. This is because 
leverage increases the firm’s chance of bankruptcy, wTich can only be avoided by the 
manager’s higher effort choice. Such disciplinary effect also presents when changing 
volatility is too costly (bottom two plots in Figure 2.5). When volatility is endogenous 
and can be implemented at low cost, leverage is a substitute for incentives (in our setup, 
incentives are company stocks), as firm bankruptcy can be prevented by an appropriate 
volatility choice. Therefore, increases in leverage are not likely to influence managerial 
actions (top two plots in Figure 2.5), but rather incentives rewarded to the manager.
These results show that controlling (by, e.g., regulation on pay) the manager’s 
incentives are unlikely to reduce her risk-taking choices, as shareholders can maintain 
managerial risk-taking by increasing the firm’s leverage. Alternatively, measures that 
combine capital requirement and pay regulation (which limits both risk-taking of the 
shareholders and the manager) can be more effective to reduce risk-taking attitudes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we introduce 
the model and in section 2.3 we outline the solution methodology. Section 2.4 con­
tains numerical results whereas section 2.5 discusses empirical implications. Section 
2 . 6  concludes.
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2.2 The model
The structure of the basic model follows Holmstrom [1979]. There are two times, de­
noted by to and t\. The firm’s asset value at ti, Xi ,  is a function of managerial effort 
a. In addition to effort a, the manager can influence the company’s volatility v (e.g., 
by choosing a certain operational policy). Both effort and volatility are costly to im­
plement. Managerial effort increases the company’s asset value but at the manager’s 
personal cost. We assume volatility choice is also costly because it is costly for the man­
ager to manage the firm’s risk. This assumption is different to Cadenillas et al. [2004] 
where volatility is costless to change. Higher volatility also has a positive impact on the 
expected asset value. This can be interpreted as a risk premium. We assume that the 
manager optimally chooses effort, a, and volatility, v , to maximize her expected termi­
nal utility. When the manager’s actions are not observable, the compensation package 
must be chosen based on the rational expectations of shareholders, who anticipate the 
manager’s choice.
Effort and volatility are endogenous variables of the model, which is essential to our 
understanding of the manager’s action choices. We assume shareholders can issue debt 
and denote the face value of the debt, L. At A, the total value of company’s equity is,
S ( X 1) = ( l - C ) ( X 1 - L - w ) +, (2.1)
where X\  denotes levered firm asset value at maturity, t \ , w is manager’s fixed wage, 
and C  G [0,1] is fraction of company stock awarded to the manager. The equity value 
at maturity, S ( X i), is the firm’s asset value net of debt and salary. Stock compensation 
is a convex instrument because the manager’s loss is limited (as stock payoff cannot be 
negative) and her gain is uncapped.
The firm’s levered asset value at t\ equals
X i  = (Xq +  Bo) exp |  [r +  a +  a(a + v)]T +  (<r +  v)ey/TJ , (2 .2 )
where a € (0, +oo) is manager effort choice.8 Effort increases the expected asset value, 
E ( X i ) .  v € ( - c t , o o )  is the manager’s volatility choice; it can take negative values 
which is interpreted as reducing firm’s total risk, a is the firm’s normal risk if there
8Although effort can go to infinity, it is never the optimal choice in the model.
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is no action to change the firm’s volatility. It is the normal level of risk when there is 
no managerial level intervention, a represents maximum volatility level by which can 
be reduced; we impose the strict inequality a < <7 , as there are physical limitations 
concerning how much risk the manager can reduce. X 0 is the firm’s unlevered asset 
value at to, B q is the debt value at to. r is the risk-free interest rate, a  is a positive 
constant that measures the benefits associated with higher risk, a  is the reason the 
manager would want to increase firm volatility, otherwise the risk averse manager will 
only reduce firm volatility. Cadenillas et al. [2004] interpret a  as the slope of the 
Capital Market Line, which depends on characteristics of the firm. We adopt the same 
interpretation here. T  — t\ — to is the time interval between the two periods, e is a 
random variable that takes value 1 and -1 . Since X\  is an exponential function, e is 
chosen as /
1 with probability p
(2.3)
— 1 with probability 1 — p
V
where p is
1 _  e-(^+u)vT
P  ~  e ( a + v ) V T  _  e - ( a + v ) V T
Probability p is set so that E[Ai] is always equal to (Ao -f B q) exp |  [r +  a +  o:(<x -f 
u ) ] t | . 9 In this setting, the manager’s volatility choice affects the firm value as well 
as the probability of each value state, where prior literature assumes one of the two 
for tractability. For example, John and John [1993] assume that the managerial action 
only affects the probability of each state .10 Edmans and Liu [2011] assume it only 
affects the value of each state. As shown, Xi  is a function of managerial effort and 
volatility. We assume a +  v is the firm’s total risk, which includes both systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk. In this sense, v is total risk choice.
is chosen to elim inate bias of the exponential function so that volatility only contributes to
expected return though risk premium a.
10In John and John [1993], value of each state is constant but probability of each state  is controlled
by the manager.
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2.2.1 M anager’s problem
The manager is risk averse and has power law utility function u(x)
u (x ) =  j— ~ > 7  > 0 and 7  ^  1 , (2.5)
where 7  is the coefficient of risk-aversion. Utility is additively separable in income 
and action. This assumption is conventional in the literature. In addition to effort we 
explicitly introduce volatility as an action variable. h(a, v) denotes the manager’s cost 
function or disutility to effort,
h(a,v) = Aiae + A 2 \ v f , 0 > 1, [3 > 1, (2.6)
where A\,  Ao, are both positive constants. 6 and j3 are larger than 1 so that the cost 
function is always convex in both effort and volatility. Since it is costly to increase and 
decrease volatility, absolute value is used to make sure volatility cost is always positive.
The manager tries her best to avoid negative payoffs, as negative payoffs make her 
utility equal to negative infinity. This is because the manager’s payoff will be 0  when 
the firm fails, as shown on equation (2.8) in the next page. Such a payoff leads to 
undesired results under the power law utility function. The cost function is similar to
the linear case of Guo and Ou-Yang [2006]. It is increasing and convex in both effort
and volatility. This cost function assumes that agent does not take any action to change 
risk (when v = 0), the risk of the firm value is simply a.11 The lowest value v could 
take is —cf, and we assume the —a < a hold. This is a rather practical assumption as 
certain risks are not possible to reduce.
In our setup, it is costly to increase (positive value of v) and decrease (negative value 
of v) volatility. This volatility choice has a similar effect to hedging. For example, Bettis 
et al. [2001] assume that firms can change volatility by costly hedging. There is always 
cost involved when the manager varies the firm’s basic risk level. This assumption is 
practically important, because most financial firms spend large sums to manage their 
risk. The manager incurs volatility cost because altering the firm’s risk level requires
11 We could also consider a family of Cobb-Douglas-type cost functions h(a,v) =  ko6v&. However, 
interdependence between a and v results in the manager choosing either a or v of zero which makes the  
cost function always equal to  zero. In that case, the manager can choose the other decision variable 
at infinity which makes the maximization problem unsolvable. Guo and Ou-Yang [2006] avoid this 
problem by assuming firm risk is infinite when managerial action is zero.
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costly effort. Identifying the right risky project to invest in is a pressurized process 
that requires skills. Engaging in hedging strategies is also costly because the manager 
incurs a cost maintaining such a hedging programme. In this sense, the volatility cost 
is very similar to the effort cost.
Guo and Ou-Yang [2006] consider a similar setup, but they only allow for the case 
where it is costly to reduce risk. We argue that volatility cost is increasing on both 
sides, that is when either increasing or reducing risk. In addition to linear contracts 
we consider the convexity of stock compensation. Given the manager’s utility and cost 
function, her objective function is given by,
m axE  ju[M(Ai)] -  h(a, u)j, (2.7)
where M ( X \ ) is the manager’s wealth function at t\, given by
M(Xi)
0 if A i G [0, L]
Ai - L  if A i e ( L , L  + w] (2.8)
C(Ai -  L -  w) +  w if Ai G (L +  w, +oo)
Ai is the firm’s levered asset value defined in equation (2.2). The manager’s action has 
direct impact on her compensation through effort and volatility choice. In the event 
of liquidation, we assume the following residual claim structure: debtholders have the 
highest seniority over residual claim, the manager or employees of the firm following 
next, shareholders following last. In the first case the firm asset value is lower than 
the face value of the debt. The firm liquidates and the manager receives nothing. 
Shareholders’ value also goes to zero. When L is equal to zero, the firm is unlevered 
and value of equity is equal to the firm value.
The second case occurs when the firm asset value is higher than the debt value but 
this is insufficient to pay the manager’s fixed wage w. Hence, the manager receives 
Ai -  L. Within the third range, the firm value is large enough both the manager’s 
fixed wage w and stock grant C can be paid.
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2.2.2 Shareholders’ problem
We assume that shareholders decide on the managerial compensation policy. In addi­
tion, we also assume that shareholders are in control of the firm’s leverage, L. Stulz 
[1990] and Cadenillas et al. [2004] also make similar assumptions about leverage choice, 
whereas Carlson and Lazrak [2010] assume that the manager decides leverage. The 
shareholders’ objective is to maximize the firm’s outside equity value
max E  S (Xi) , (2.9)
WyCyL I J
where ^ (X i) is given,
0 if X i e [ 0 , L  + iv]
S ( X 1) = { (2.10)
{ l - C ) { X i  L  w) if Xi  £ (L + w, + 0 0 )
S ( X  1) is firm equity value given the firm’s asset value X \ . The first range represents the 
case where the firm asset value is lower than the combined face value of the debt and
the managerial wage, w. The firm asset value is the residual claim to the debtholder,
which is equal to X\ .  The second range corresponds to the case where the firm asset 
value is large enough for both the manager’s fixed wage w and debt repayment L.
The shareholders’ problem is subject to the following condition,
s.t. (a, v) G argmax |ia[M (X l)] -  h(a, u ) j  (2.11)
e { u [M(X i )] - h { a , v ) }  > u { H 0) (2 .1 2 )
These are participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Participation con­
straint (2 .1 2 ) represents the minimum expected utility the manager is willing to work 
for the firm. Here Ho is the certainty equivalent that represents the manager’s external 
opportunities. In a general equilibrium model, H q would be determined by the competi­
tive market. The second condition (2.11) is the incentive compatibility constraint which 
assumes that the manager works optimally to maximize her utility, given shareholders’ 
choices. This constraint is essential to the second-best problem since shareholders can­
not observe (hence enforce) the manager’s action. The first-best problem is discussed
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in the next section.
The timeline of decisions is as follow: at the beginning of to, shareholders determine 
the optimal decision variables (w, C, L) to maximize firm’s equity value. In determining 
these variables, shareholders anticipate the effect of these variables on the manager’s 
action choices and the manager’s expected utility. After observing firm leverage and 
the compensation package chosen by shareholders, the manager optimally chooses her 
effort and volatility to maximize expected terminal utility. If expected utility is higher 
than her reservation utility Hq, she accepts the offer. The game ends at t\ when the 
firm liquidates, and shareholders pay off the manager and debtholders.
2.2.3 Equal seniority o f managerial and debtholders’ claim s
The existing principal-agent literature commonly assumes that managers are compen­
sated exclusively with cash and equity. Our analysis above makes similar assumptions. 
While empiricists find CEOs have a large amount of defined benefit pensions (e.g. 
Bebchuk and Jackson [2005], Sundaram and Yermack [2007]), which are unsecured 
obligations similar to a risky debt, these benefits would yield an equal claim with other 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. This is a debt-like feature, thus pension benefits 
are debt-like compensa.tion. Empirical studies (see Kabir et al. [2010] for another ex­
ample) find a widespread use of debt-like compensation, but theories on this are almost 
non-existent; a notable first step is Edmans and Liu [2011] who argue that inside debt 
is a more effective solution to the risk-shifting problem than bonuses. In the previous 
setup, we limit the compensation package to equity and cash. A natural extension of 
the risk-shifting problem is directly introduce debt-related pay to the manager’s com­
pensation package, so that the manager does not only work to maximize probability 
of the firm’s survival but also value of the firm at insolvency. The latter is very im­
portant to debtholders and reducing the risk-shifting problem, and it can easily be 
imposed in debt covenants. This approach also relaxes the riskless debt assumption 
where the manager does not work if the firm has a positive probability of bankruptcy. 
The managerial utility is no longer a negative infinity at bankruptcy, because her payoff 
is non-zero, as the debt compensation ensures the manager has a positive payoff in the 
event of firm failure.
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Therefore, this alternative way of compensation results in the manager’s payoff at 
ti being as follows,
M { X f )  =
e X f  if X f  e  [0, L]
(2.13)
C ( X f  - L )  + eL if X ?  e  (L, +oo)
where M ( X f )  represents the manager’s payoff when she is rewarded with debt, in 
which case her total pay package consists of two components -  equity and debt, slightly 
different from the equity-cash combination shown in equation (2.8). C denotes the 
fraction of the manager’s equity reward and e represents the fraction of the manager’s 
debt compensation. X® denotes the firm’s asset value when rewarding the manager 
with debt compensation,
X f  = (Xq +  B q )  exp |  [■r +  a +  a(a +  v)]T +  (a +  u)ev/T'J, (2.14)
This value is very similar to X\  in equation (2.2). The only difference is in the initial 
value of debt, B q , which is now risky and needs to be valued with rational expectation. 
As the debt compensation package allows the firm’s debt to be risky, so the firm may 
have a positive probability of failure. At maturity t\ the debt value B f  is given by,
(1 — e)XP  if X P  e  [0, L]
B f  = i l l  (2 15)
(1  — e)L if X f  £ (A, +oo)
>.
where L  is face value of the risky debt. Since debtholders have the highest priority 
on the firm’s residual claim, debtholders always receive min[(l -  e)L,  (1 -  e ) X f  ]. It is
worth noting that debtholders are fully aware of the manager’s compensation contract.
They know part of the manager’s compensation comes from debt so that they correctly 
discount this value into the debt price. At t0, the debt value is simply the discounted 
expected value of B f ,
= e~rTE{B°{X? , L ) \  (2.16)
where B P { X ° , L )  indicates dependence on both X f  and L. Since there is no interest 
payment, B f  is a zero-coupon bond. Solving this non-linear equation with lespect
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t°  B q identifies a unique B ®. We assume no tax advantage and no bankruptcy cost 
associates with debt financing.
The shareholders objective under the debt compensation scheme is also very similar 
to equation (2 .1 0 ) -  they maximize the firm’s equity value,
(2.17) 
Where S ( X P )  is the firm’s equity value when rewarding the manager with debt; at
time t\ it is given as follows,
S(X}
0 if x p  e  [0, L]
(1 -  C ) ( x p  -  L )  if x p  e  (L , Too)
(2.18)
Standard participation and incentive compatibility constraints apply here, which are 
the same as in equations (2.12) and (2.11). The complete payoff structure is reported in 
Table 2 .1 . As shown, the manager, shareholders and bondholders are actually playing 
a zero sum game with respect to the firm’s asset value, e.g. X \  or X p .
Table 2.1: The table reports payoffs to the manager, shareholders and bondholders. The 
manager, shareholders and bondholders are playing a zero sum game, as their payoffs sum 
up to the firm’s total asset value, equal to either X\  or Xp.
Firm asset value, X \  or X P [0 , L] ( L,  L  + w] (.L  + w ,  +oo)
The manager is rewarded with equity, G', and fixed wage, w,
The manager’s payoff, M { X \ )  
Shareholders’ payoff, S ( X i) 




X x - L
0
L
C ( X \  -  L  -  w )  +  w  
(1 -  C ) { X 1 -  L  -  w )  
L
Total Xi Xi X i
The manager is rewarded with equity, C, and debt, e,
The manager’s payoff, M ( X P )  




( l - e p f f
C ( x p  - L )  +  e L  
(1 -  C ) ( X P  -  L) 
(1  -  e)L
C ( x p  ~ L )  +  e L  
(1 -  C ) ( X ?  -  L) 
(1 -  e)L
Total X ? x p x p
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2.3 Solution m ethodology
In this section, we solve the manager’s and shareholders’ problems. Since the problem 
involves two parties, we solve the problem in two stages. In the second stage, we solve 
the problem for the manager. The solution of the manager problem is then used to solve 
the shareholders’ problem. Both first-best and second-best are explored. Our problem 
does not admit a closed formed solution as mentioned previously this is largely due to 
shareholders’ payoff function (which is exponential) and a power law utility .12
2.3.1 M anager’s choices
First, we derive the solution to the manager’s problem as described in the previous 
section. We ignore the shareholders’ problem here, and treat all other shareholders’ de­
cision variables as given. In isolation of the shareholders’ problem, the manager chooses 
her effort and volatility to maximize her terminal expected utility. From equation (2.7), 
the first-order conditions are:
E {aX iT[C(A T - L - w ) + w ]  7  j  -  9Aia6-1 =  0
E \ Y
(Ai -  L -  w ) 1 "7  
1 - 7
+ CXi Z[ C( Xi  — L — w)  + w] 7} -  P A 2\v \p ~ 1 = 0
(2.19)
These are the first-order conditions in the region Ai G (L +  w , +  oo). When A i € 
(L,L + w), FOC is
A iT (A i -  L) 7  -  0A\ae~l =  0 
Y (X l  ~ L^  + X \ Z ( X \  -  L ) ~ 7 1 =  0
1 - 7  -I
where Ai is defined in equation (2 .2 ), Z  is a random variable that equals,
(2 .20)
Z  =
a T  + y/T with probability p
aT  — y/T  with probability 1 -  p
(2 .21 )
12 Cadenillas et al. [2004] use a simple payoff function which does not accom m odate seniority structure 
of debt. They do not investigate incentives effect of leverage.
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and Y  is equal to
„ ( ~ v ~ e r ) \ / T
Y  =
e ( v + t r ) \ / T  _ e ( - v - c r ) \ / T
( e (v+<7) V T + e ( - v - c r )V T ' j  
^ r (v+o-)VT  _ e ( - v - o ) \ / T ' j
e ( - v - a ) \ / T  
e  ( v + a  ) V T  _  e  ( -  v  -  a  ) \ / T
( l _ e ( - v -<j ) V t '  ^ ^ e ( v + a ) V T  _^.e ( - v - a ) V T  )  
( e (u  +  a ) V T _ e (  v - a ) y / T ^
+
with probability p
with probability 1 — p
(2 .22 )
Equations (2.19) and (2.20) are non-linear, because of the exponential function in equa­
tion (2.2). The problem can be easily solved using iteration methods, the only difficulty 
is making a starting point that results in X \  G (L + iv, + 00). To demonstrate the man­
ager’s optimal choice, Figure 2 . 1  plots an optimal solution for the manager problem 
with base case parameters, as a function of incentives, C.




|  - 0.000025





Figure 2.1: Optimal effort and volatility. Optimal effort and volatility with base case 
parameters. The figure plots managerial optimal effort and volatility with varying level of 
C, which denotes stock awarded to the manager. Parameter values are those of the base 
case: X0 = 100, Ax = 0.5, A 2 = 2, T  = 1, a  = 0.05, a = 0.3, 6 = 2 , /? = 2 , 7  = 4, H 0 = 10, 
r = 0.03, T = 1. The solid line represents leverage, L = 0, the dashed line represents 
leverage, L  = 50. The upper two graphs plot optimal effort and volatility with low level of 
fixed wage, w — 0. The lower two graphs plot with high level of fixed wage, w = 10.
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2.3.1.1 The manager’s choices for base case
Managerial effort does not always increase with incentives. On the contrary, when the 
manager does not have any fixed wage, effort decreases dramatically with more incen­
tives, as shown in the upper left graph of Figure 2.1. From first order condition (2.19), 
when w = 0  the optimal effort and volatility are a hyperbolic function of incentives 
C. Optimal effort strictly decreases with more incentives and volatility strictly in­
creases with incentives. Maximum optimal effort occurs at C = 0  at which point effort 
a = +oo, this property is special to the power law utility function, since the utility func­
tion equals negative infinity at 0. A similar result is obtained for the optimal volatility 
which reaches minimum at C =  0 . It is worth noting that we constrain volatility choice 
with minimum of —a as we do not allow the actual volatility, v +  a, to fall to zero. 
There is a limit as to how much volatility the manager is able to reduce. The combined 
effect of optimal effort and volatility is an extremely hard working manager that takes 
very little risk. This result contradicts the conventional thinking as it suggests the best 
incentives strategy is ‘zero compensation’ (w =  0 and (7 =  0), because the firm has no 
risk and has positive infinite drift. We point out this is not optimal when the share­
holders’ problem is presented. ‘Zero compensation’ is never optimal even though the 
manager works the hardest, because the extra condition (equation2 .1 2 ) presents in the 
principal-agent model. ‘Zero compensation’ violates participation constraint and the 
manager simply does not work for the firm. The hyperbolic relation between incentives 
and effort does not hold when w > 0 , in which case optimal effort and volatility is a 
concave function of incentives. Both effort and volatility admit a positive maximum 
with positive incentives. The results suggest that fixed wage is an important compo­
nent of managerial compensation, since the manager’s action changes radically when 
her fixed wage is 0 .
Leverage plays a crucial role in determining the manager’s action. Leverage mag­
nifies the manager’s action choice. Figure 2.1 shows a similar action pattern for both 
leverage levels, but action choices are in much larger magnitude when leverage is high. 
For example, when leverage is high, optimal effort is higher and optimal volatility is 
much lower suggesting the manager chooses higher effort and lower volatility to avoid 
default. When leverage is low, the manager chooses higher volatility and lower effort.
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One obvious observation is that volatility is low when effort is high, and vice versa. 
Since optimal effort and volatility are simultaneously determined, depending on the 
relative cost of implementing each one, the manager may choose a high level of effort 
and a low level of volatility to maximize her expected utility. For example, when 
C  =  0.5, the bottom two graphs in Figure 2 .1  show relatively low levels of effort and 
a high level of volatility. From the shareholders’ point of view, the best option to 
maximize expected equity value is to choose moderate levels of fixed wage and low 
levels of incentive so that the manager chooses a moderate level of effort and a positive 
level of volatility. The optimal levels of C and w are reported in the next section.
Figure 2 . 1  plots C up to 1 or 1 0 0 %, in which case the manager owns the whole 
company. When C — 1, the manager is also the sole shareholder in the firm. The 
manager’s action does not change because she is still risk-averse. The manager is not 
allowed to become a risk-neutral shareholder in our setup. It is worth noting that the 
optimal effort shown in Figure 2.1 is not the manager’s actual observable performance, 
which is measured based on shareholders’ return. It only shows, for given compensation 
packages, how the manager makes her effort choice. This feature is different to the 
standard literature which assumes the manager can only influence the mean of the 
firm asset value e.g. Dittmann and Maug [2007]. In the absence of volatility choice, 
high levels of effort always translate into high performance. In our model the firm’s 
performance also depends on the manager’s volatility choice, low effort choice does not 
necessarily translate to low observable performance. It may well be the case where high 
effort choice results in low performance (e.g. Guo and Ou-Yang [2006]).
2.3.2 F irst-b est problem
As a benchmark for comparison, we also solve the first-best problem. In the first best 
case, the shareholders’ can observe the manager’s choice so that they can contract on 
the manager’s actions; their objective function is
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where ^(X i) and M (X i) are defined in equations (2.8) and (2.10). The incentive 
compatibility constraint is absent in this problem since the shareholder can issue a 
forcing contract to make sure the manager chooses a proper action. The problem is 
first-best, as there is no moral hazard, and agency cost is equal to 0 . Given the payoff 
structure of M (X i), S'(Xi) and utility function, a closed-form solution is very unlikely. 
It is worth mentioning that moral-hazard problem of this type are generally difficult 
to solve. The mathematical problem has received some academic attention (Prescott 
[2004], Su and Judd [2007] and Armstrong et al. [2007]).
2.3.3 Second-best problem
When managerial actions cannot be contracted upon, the solution is second-best. We 
outline here a numerical method that solves the optimal second-best problem. In the 
second stage of the problem the manager observes the compensation contract and firm 
leverage. If the contract offers expected utility higher than u(Hq), the manager accepts 
the contract and optimally chooses the level of a and v.
In the first stage of the problem, shareholders choose the compensation contract 
(w, C) and the firm leverage L. We assume that shareholders can observe the value 
of Xi ,  and impose rational expectations. So shareholders correctly foresee the second 
stage managerial effort and volatility choice. It is not optimal for the shareholders to 
choose contract variables that provide the manager with less utility than u(Hq),  in 
which case the manager does not take the job. It is, however, optimal to choose a 
combination of C and w  that corresponds to reservation utility, u(Hq).  In that case, 
the cost to the shareholders is minimized. The manager is indifferent between all these 
contract packages as all combinations provide her with at least the reservation utility. 
The solution seeking procedure is as follows: for a given leverage, L, vary combinations 
of C and w  while maintaining the utility provided to the manager at u(Hq).  For each 
combination of C and w,  the second stage problem in equation (2.19) and (2.20) is 
solved and shareholder value computed using equation (2.10). The optimal C and w  are 
chosen to maximize shareholders’ outside equity value. This procedure is then repeated 
for all leverage choices, L. The optimal leverage, L*, is then chosen to maximize the 
outside equity value.
Essentially, the solution search procedure plots manager participation constraint 
in the shareholders’ value space. The optimal solution is merely the point on the
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participation constraint that maximizes the shareholders’ expected value. Figure 2.2 
presents an illustration and plots manager participation constraint with two endogenous 
variables.
2.4 N um erical results
In choosing the appropriate parameters for the numerical results we try to approxi­
mately conform to Cadenillas et al. [2004] and Guo and Ou-Yang [2006]. We choose 
the firm’s initial unlevered asset value, Xq, equal to 100 which is also used in Cadenillas 
et al. [2004]. We choose the coefficients of the effort function A\  and A 2 to be 0 . 5  and 
2 which is close to values used in Figure 11 of Guo and Ou-Yang [2006]. Effort and 
volatility cost parameters, 6 and /3, are both set to 2 , which is used in Figure 1 2  of Guo 
and Ou-Yang [2006]. Time is chosen to be T  = 1 . The interest rate, r, is set to 0.03. 
The firm’s initial volatility, cr, is set to 0.3 which is roughly the median volatility of 
executive stock option issues from Carpenter [1998]. The manager’s coefficient of risk 
averse, 7 , is assumed to be 4, following Kahl et al. [2003]. The manager’s reservation 
wage, Hq, is 1 0 .
As discussed in section 2.3, when more stock is awarded, the manager’s fixed wage 
is reduced. The relevant amount of cash to be deducted from the fixed wage should 
provide same level of utility as that of the additional stock. In this scenario, the 
manager is indifferent between additional stock and the higher fixed pay. Optimally, 
shareholders choose a compensation package so that it just generates enough utility for 
the manager to participate. If the manager’s reservation utility is w(30) (which means 
H 0 = 30), then the compensation package must be such that stock awarded plus fixed 
wage provide a total utility of «(30).
As a benchmark, we first present the solution to the first-best problem (see Table 
2.2). For the parameters reported, it is optimal to reduce volatility which is equivalent 
to negative v. This is because shareholders trade off volatility for more leverage and 
effort. Since incentivizing managerial work is not important in the first-best case, 
shareholders choose to reduce volatility and rely on managerial effort to generate return.
The first-best problem admits multiple solutions (see left plot in Figure 2.3). This 
is because incentives are not important in the first-best problem as shareholders can 
















Figure 2.2: Second-best solution. The figure plots the manager’s participation con­
straint (PC) with two pairs of endogenous variables. For each level of W. C is adjusted 
so that PC always binds. The optimal solution is obtained at C* = 0.71%, w* ~  10.72 
and L* = 288.40 with shareholders value £'[5(yifi)] = 102.67. Figure on the left plots PC 
at L = 288.40 (the solid line) and L = 200 (the dashed line), the maximum is attained 
at w — 10.72. Figure on the right plots PC at w = 10.72 (the solid line) and w — 2 (the 
dashed line), the maximum is attended at L = 288.40.
of solutions on the shareholders’ indifference curve. For an easy comparison, we fix the 
incentive, C, at zero so that the manager’s reservation utility is entirely provided from 
the fixed wage. Results in Table 2.2 are expected. Interestingly, (3 and 0 have a similar 
impact on shareholders’ effort and volatility choices. As effort is increasing in both f3 
and (9 , whereas volatility is decreasing in both variables, it seems effort and volatility 
cost have similar impacts on shareholders’ choices. When j3 =  8  and 10, the optimal 
volatility equals -0.2. This is merely the maximum amount of volatility shareholders 
can reduce.
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Table 2.2: ihe table reports the first-best solution for various exogenous parameters. 
Other non-varying parameters are as follows: X 0 = 100, a = 0.3, a = 0.2, A x = 0.5, A x = 
2. a and v is effort and volatility. C is optimal stock ownership awarded to the manager. 
w is fixed wage awarded to the manager. L is face value of debt. £?[5(Jfi)] represents 
expected equity value. Shareholders maximize expected equity value with respect to five 
decision variables: managerial effort, a; firm volatility, v\ stock ownership, C; fixed wage, 
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2.4.1 A gency costs
Now we are ready to present the solution to the general second-best problem. Table 2.3 
presents the optimal solution for the first-best and second-best problem with various
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Table 2.3: The table reports the second-best solution for various exogenous parameters. 
Other non-varying parameters are as follows: Z 0 = 100, a = 0.3, a = 0 .2 , Ax = 0.5, 
A\ — 2 . a and v is manager’s optimal effort and volatility choice. C is optimal stock 
ownership awarded to the manager, w is manager’s fixed wage. L is face value of debt. 
E[S(Xi )] represents expected equity value. Shareholders maximize expected equity value 
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ranges of exogenous parameters; the first rows are results for the base case discussed 
previously. Comparing results between Tables 2.2 and 2.3, shareholders’ value £7[5(Xi)] 
is slightly higher in the first-best case, around 2 % higher for most parameters. Optimal 
incentives, C, reported for the second-best are around 1 %, depending on exogenous
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Figure 2.3: Indifference curve. This figure plots the indifference curves of the manager 
and shareholders. The figure plots manager participation constraint (PC) and shareholder 
indifference curve in C and w space. The left figure is the first-best problem; the right 
figure is the second-best. The solid lines are the manager’s PC and the dashed lines are 
the shareholders’ indifference curves. Exogenous parameters are those of the base case.
parameters. These results are quantitatively similar to Suntheim [2010], who reports 
bank managers’ average ownership is 0.23%. For some parameter values, incentives 
are very small, less than 0.1%. This is because shareholders only reward incentives to 
managers who are not very risk averse ( 7  < 5). Unlike many studies that allow for 
negative stock ownership, e.g. Feltham and Wu [2001] and Dittmann and Maug [2007], 
we restrict both incentive and fixed wages to be positive.
2.4.2 Incentive-perform ance relation
Since our model does not have a closed formed solution, we draw inference from our 
numerical results. Earlier literature proposes a positive incentive-performance relation 
(performance is measured by firm’s total asset value after deducting compensation to 
the manager and debt to bondholders), because incentives always induce positive effort.
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In the absence of volatility choice, it implies a positive incentive-performance relation. 
Our results also show the positive incentive-effort relation as higher incentives always 
lead to a higher effort choice (e.g. first section of Table 2.3 show effort and incentives 
decreases with more risk aversion, 7 ). However, the incentive-performance relationship 
is not always positive. For example a higher value of j3 results in higher performance but 
lower incentives. It suggests a negative incentive-performance relation. Since manage­
rial performance also depends on volatility choice, which shows no persistent relation 
with performance, it is hard to infer any quantitative relation between incentive and 
performance.
Such a nonlinear relation is not present in the classical model where both incen­
tives and performance can go to infinity.13 This problem only exists when volatility 
is endogenous. Therefore, we also report results when volatility choice is not available 
(see Table 2.4, 2.5). These results additionally support this argument, as the incentive- 
performance relation is positive for all variations of exogenous variables except for 9. 
Since 9 can also measure the manager’s skills (as high 9 means the manager can ex­
ert more effort with less cost), the manager with high value of 9 would have higher 
reservation wage if this is a full equilibrium model. To show this point, we isolate the 
impact of endogenous leverage on the incentive-performance relation and report results 
when leverage is fixed at zero (see Table 2.7). The incentive-performance relation is 
positive for the three reported exogenous variables 7 , T, and a. But it is not mono­
tonic in 9. When the manager is very skilled, optimal incentives are simply bounded 
by the participation constraint. 14 In this sense, optimal incentives do not increase even 
when the manager is more skilled. So the incentive-performance relation is not positive. 
Fully endogenous 9 and Hq would solve the problem, and we expect the same positive 
incentive-performance relation when volatility is not endogenous.
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Table 2.4: First-best solution with no volatility choice. The table reports the first-best 
solution for various exogenous parameters. Other exogenous parameters are as follows: 
X q = 100, a = 0.3, Ai — 0.5, A\ — 2 . a is optimal effort choice. C is optimal stock 
ownership awarded to the manager, w is fixed wage awarded to the manager. L is face value 
of debt. £'[S,(Ai)] represents the expected outside equity value. Shareholders maximize 
the expected outside equity value with respect to four decision variables: managerial effort, 
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2.4.3 Effect o f leverage
Previous theoretical literature investigating manager’s risk attitude largely ignores the 
impact of firm leverage, or treats leverage as exogenously given. We explicitly endo- 
genize leverage in our model. When leverage is endogenous, the relationship between 
leverage and other endogenous variables is driven by a common exogenous variable. Ta­
ble 2.3 reports optimal solutions for various exogenous variables. Leverage has a mixed 
relationship with volatility across different variations of exogenous variables (column 6  
of Table 2.3). When volatility cost is low, optimal volatility shows a negative relation­
ship with leverage. Because low volatility cost implies that the manager chooses high 
volatility, shareholders anticipate the manager’s high volatility choice and reduce lever­
age to avoid potential bankruptcy. The optimal leverage almost halves between /? =  4 
and 10. The optimal volatility is around 0.14 when (3 = 10, and is quite significant 
compared to the base case result of -0.004. The optimal leverage is only chosen so that 
the firm has a zero probability of bankruptcy. Shareholders always take just enough 
leverage so that the firm has no probability of failure. This mechanism also drives the 
mixed incentive-performance relation as we showed in the previous subsection. On the 
other hand, effort is positively related to both leverage and incentives, a relation that is 
well understood in the principal-agent literature, because both incentives and leverage 
have same effects on the manager’s effort choice.
2.4 .4  Effect of endogenous volatility
To investigate effect of endogenous volatility, we also report (Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.7) 
results for the conventional principal-agent model where the manager can only exert 
effort. The results support the argument that the manager’s tradeoff utility between 
effort and volatility. With endogenous volatility choice, the optimal leverage is slightly 
higher when the effort cost is high. This is because negative volatility choice affords 
the firm more leverage.
13See equations 10 and 11 of Guo and Ou-Yang [2006], where an infinite skilled manager can have 
incentive infinitely close to 1 and the principal’s (not strictly speaking shareholder) payoff always 
increases with incentive. So that the incentive-performance relation is always positive.
14T he reason is as follows: the optimal solution is obtain at small value of, w, because 0 is so 
large that awarding the manager with fixed wage is simply not optimal. And optim al incentives are 
hyperbolic function of optimal effort when w is zero, hence incentives should be as small as possible 
to extract higher managerial effort. But contract is bounded below by the participation constraint, so 
the optim al incentives, C, are simply implied by the participation constraint.
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T able  2.5: Second-best solution with no volatility choice. The table reports second- 
best solution for various exogenous parameters. Other non-varying parameters are as 
follows: X q =  100, cr =  0.3, a =  0.2, A\  =  0.5, A\  =  2. a and v is manager’s optimal 
effort and volatility choice. C  is optimal stock ownership awarded to the manager, w is 
manager’s fixed wage. L is face value of debt. E fSpC )] represents expected equity value. 
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However, when effort cost is low, endogenous volatility leads to lower leverage (see 
column 6  of Table 2.3 and column 5 of Table 2.5). This is because effort impacts more 
on the firm’s value than volatility does. Overall, when effort and volatility cost are 




























F ig u re  2.4: M ixed  incentive-leverage re la tion . This figure plots optimal incentives 
with varying level of leverage. L is firm leverage, optimal incentives are solved by keeping 
leverage exogenous. All plots use base case parameters unless otherwise specified. Plot on 
the top left uses (5 =  4. Plot on the top right uses 7 =  3. Bottom left plot uses T — 3, 
bottom  right plot uses 0 =  3.
2.4.5 Incentive-leverage relationship
Optimal incentives show mixed results with firm leverage. To demonstrate this, we fix 
leverage at various exogenous levels and solve the optimal problem. As shown in Figure 
3.2, the incentive-leverage relation is not monotonic and it depends on the manager’s 
risk aversion, effort and volatility cost, and time. For example, the relationship is pos­
itive for 7  =  3, negative for /3 =  4 and positive again for T  = 3. For 0 =  3, it is not 
monotonic. It seems that the incentive-leverage relationship is very sensitive to changes 
in exogenous variables, as optimal compensation is made to balance risk-inducing ef­
fects of incentives and leverage. This result also holds even though volatility is not 
endogenous; we reports results with no volatility choice (Table 2.7), where incentives 
again show mixed relation with leverage.
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2.4.6 Exogenous leverage
When leverage is endogenous, companies choose the highest possible leverage level to 
extract returns from the manager’s action. All optimal solutions are obtained at the 
highest possible leverage, where slight increases in leverage beyond the optimal level 
would result in firm bankruptcy. This result is commonly known in the banking indus­
try where all banks take as much leverage as they possibly can. However, leverage of, 
for instance, banks are not fully endogenous because of capital requirements15, which 
impose an upper bound on leverage. We report optimal solutions under three exoge­
nously specified leverage levels. Since regulated maximum (or externally constrained) 
leverage ratios are lower than the otherwise optimal one, our reported (see Table 2.6) 
leverage is relatively low compared to the optimally chosen.
Interestingly, there are some cases in which the optimal effort and volatility do not 
change across the three levels of leverage. For example, when (3 =  4 optimal effort and 
volatility is 0.21 and 39.7 for all three levels of leverage, even though optimal incentives 
change from 0.20% to 0.08%. In this case optimal effort and volatility is insensitive 
to the leverage changes, which only affect the optimal incentives. Under this scenario, 
leverage and incentives are a similar way of making the manager behave optimally. 
Previous literature has similar findings that leverage is another incentive tool (which 
may act as a substitute to incentive compensation) used to encourage managerial hard 
work and risk-taking. Our results certainly demonstrate such arguments.
However, such indifference effects are only observed when volatility is a choice vari­
able (see Table 2.7) and the volatility cost is low. When the volatility cost is high, 
leverage acts as a disciplinary tool for effort as it forces the manager to exert more ef­
fort. When the volatility cost is low, leverage acts as a substitute for incentives. Since 
leverage merely impacts on optimal incentives but has no effect on the manager’s action 
choice. Figure 2.5 clearly demonstrates this effect. W hen volatility cost is high, optimal 
volatility is indifferent from zero across all leverage levels. But effort shows a positive 
relation with leverage, even though incentives stay constant. On the other hand, both 
effort and volatility show little variation across leverage levels when volatility cost is 
low. Leverage does not change the manager’s action choice but does change the opti­
mal incentives. These are two effects of leverage: discipline for effort and substitute 










































Figure 2.5: Two effects of leverage. This figure demonstrates disciplinary and substi­
tution effects of leverage. The optimal solution is solved at each exogenous leverage level. 
The dotted line is based on high volatility cost (/3 — 2); the dashed line is based on low 
volatility cost (/3 — 6 ). All other parameter values are base cases as in Figure 2.2
for incentives. Such a distinction exists because of endogenous volatility choice, which 
balances shareholders’ leverage and incentives choices.
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that even though the firm is allowed to go 
bankrupt, it is never optimal for the shareholders and the manager to do so. Share­
holders anticipate the manager’s skills and choose a debt level that is manageable so 
that the firm never goes bankrupt. If there is default at any state of the economy, the 
manager’s utility is not maximized. Because debt default upon the firm’s bankruptcy 
results in the manager receiving nothing, due to power law utility function when wealth 
is zero the manager’s expected utility is negative infinity. This immediately violates 
participation constraint. The manager simply does not work if the firm has positive 
probability of bankruptcy. Shareholders anticipate the manager’s action and choose a 
safe level of debt that is robust against negative shocks, so that the firm never fails. 
Bondholders expect shareholders debt choice and correctly price their lendings. The
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net result is a riskless debt that always pays back its face value. This result is similar 
to riskless debt in Cadenillas et al. [2004] where the value of the firm is always larger 
than the nominal value of debt. The riskless assumption is relaxed when the manager 
is awarded with debt, which we discuss next.
2.4 .7  Effects o f th e equal seniority of m anagerial and debtholders’ 
claim s
Table 2.8 reports optimal second-best solution for the alternative compensation pack­
age, where the manager is awarded with equity and debt. In this case, debt is risky 
and the firm may have positive probability of failure. This, however, results in infinite 
leverage choice, as shareholders only care about the expected return of the firm. The 
manager, on the other hand, is also protected through debt compensation, which pays 
out the same compensation even if the firm fails. Under such a compensation structure, 
infinite leverage is always optimal no matter how risk averse the manager is. This is 
because derived utility function is always convex when leverage is large enough.
Although this model implies infinite leverage, such a solution is not entirely im­
plausible as banks could have much higher leverage than at present if there were no 
minimum capital requirement. We report the results for three exogenous levels of lever­
age similar to the previous section (when leverage is zero, the problem collapses to no 
debt compensation so we focus at positive leverage levels). In addition to normal range 
of leverage, we also report results for L = 2000, which is equivalent to a capital to debt 
ratio of 1 :2 0 .
W ithout doubt rewarding the manager with debt makes her very conservative in 
terms of exerting effort and choosing volatility. Comparing results between Tables 2.3 
and 2 . 8  shows that (for the same level of leverage) optimal volatility is always lower 
when the manager is rewarded with inside debt. Obviously, such optimal choices are 
achieved at the expense of the shareholders. All shareholders’ values are lower when 
the firm rewards with debt, This result is expected, as debtholders can earn returns 
higher than risk free rate (see Table 2.9). Although both debtholders’ and shareholders’ 
expected returns increase with leverage, shareholders’ return would be much higher if 
rewarding the manager with equity and fixed wage. Debt compensation in this regard 
balances payoffs for both parties.
44
2.4 Numerical results
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T ab le  2.9: Debtholder and shareholder return. This table reports the price of the risky 
debt ( B q ) ,  debtholder return (/is) and shareholder return (/is) under the alternative 
compensation scheme where the manager is rewarded with equity and debt. Parameter 
values are those of Table 2.6. Debtholder return is computed, ixD =  where L 
is face value of debt as reported below. B q  is simultaneously computed with the optimal 
solution. Similarly shareholder return is computed, /i<? =  1°g{-s is(*f)]} dpgU’C.; where 
values of E[S(XjP)] are those reported in Table 2.8.





















































































































































































3 72.17 10.30 -1.35 139.45 7.29 1.50 1556.61 25.06 56.85
4 77.02 3.80 8.95 142.94 4.82 15.94 1645.49 19.51 109.48
5 77.64 3.00 20.69 145.57 3.00 31.35 1763.02 12.61 152.82
5.5 77.64 3.00 31.20 145.57 3.00 44.64 1940.89 3.00 196.86
Debt compensation also leads to a higher effort choice, as optimal efforts are always 
higher. Generally, the relationship between leverage and other endogenous variables 
is the same as in the original model, and volatility and leverage is now negatively 
related as higher leverage always results in low volatility choice. This is in contrast 
to the substitution effect found in the original setup. One implication of a negative
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leverage-volatility relationship is that high leverage can lead the manager to reduce 
volatility substantially, e.g. for each value of /3, volatility reduction is quite significant. 
When f3 (measure of volatility cost) is larger than 8 , optimal volatility actually hits the 
lower bound, a =  0 .2 . Such an action is intuitive, as volatility cost is so low that the 
manager relies solely on reducing volatility to maximize her expected utility. Overall, 
debt compensation makes the manager work harder and take less risk, and significantly 
reduces the manager’s risk-taking for a given leverage level.
2.5 Empirical implications
Our results show that the incentive-leverage relationship is not monotonic, depending 
on the firm’s investment opportunities and the manager’s skills. When volatility cost 
is high, shareholders choose high incentives exposing the manager to more risk which 
makes her choose lower volatility. This results in a positive relationship between incen­
tives and leverage. When the volatility cost is low, shareholders choose low incentives 
and high leverage to encourage risk-taking, and the incentive-leverage relationship is 
negative. Results in Table 2.6 demonstrate that incentives are negatively related to 
leverage when the volatility cost is low, and positively related when managerial risk- 
aversion is low. These results explain mixed findings in the empirical literature; for 
example Coles et al. [2006], Ortiz-Molina [2007] and Gao [2010] find negative incentive- 
leverage whereas Lewellen [2006] finds a positive relationship.
It would be very interesting to test the relationship between leverage and incentives 
in a structural model, where compensation contracts and firm volatility are simultane­
ously determined. Coles et al. [2006] test this and find a positive relationship. This 
result is different from predictions of our model, where incentives have a mixed rela­
tionship with leverage, as we assume the manager can influence the firm’s return and 
volatility by exerting optimal action, which is not explicitly considered in their paper. 
To the best of our knowledge, previous empirical studies do not explicitly take this point 
into account. It would be appealing to revisit this problem with two more endogenous 
variables -  firm return and volatility -  to account for the effect of the manager’s action.
Our results also show that there exists a flat region of action (for firms with low 
volatility cost) where exogenous leverage only affects the optimal incentives choice.
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Since capital requirements (an exogenous leverage level) for banks have increased af­
ter the credit crunch (see Slovik and Cournede [2 0 1 1 ] for recent capital requirements 
changes), it would be interesting to test such implications based on this natural ex­
periment. As expected, the same level of risk-taking should be observed for large, 
international banks which have relatively low volatility cost, with a significant reduc­
tion in their CEOs’ incentives.
Debt-like compensation helps to reduce managerial risk-taking as well as making 
the manager work hard. This interesting phenomenon is demonstrated in our numerical 
results, and empirical work could potentially explore this area, in which management’s 
debt-like compensation is ignored. It is an ongoing debate that the bank manager’s 
incentive is highly skewed and in part contributed to the financial downfall in 2008. 
Since then new legislation has been passed to defer most bankers’ pay, which is a feature 
similar to our debt-like compensation. It would be interesting to revisit these banks 
executives’ incentives position taking into account their inside debt positions.
2.6 Conclusions
We develop a model explicitly accounting for the manager’s ability to influence risk. 
Different from previous literature in risk shifting (Cadenillas et al. [2004], Guo and Ou- 
Yang [2006], Carlson and Lazrak [2010]) we assume that the manager can both increase 
or decrease the firm’s risk at a cost. Our results demonstrate that the relationship 
between incentives and performance is not always positive; it depends on managerial 
skills and firm characteristics.
In addition to the manager’s ability to influence risk, we explicitly consider the con­
nection between leverage and compensation. Leverage is important to the shareholders 
because it magnifies the firm return. It is also important to the manager because the 
decision of the optimal compensation contract largely depends on leverage. Our results 
demonstrate that leverage can be regarded as a substitute for incentives only when 
volatility is endogenous, since leverage encourages similar managerial actions as those 
of compensation incentives. When volatility is not endogenous, leverage serves as a 
disciplinary tool as higher leverage always leads to higher effort choice.
We also extend the conventional principal-agent model to include debt-like com­
pensation. For a given leverage level, our results show that debt-like compensation
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not only reduces managerial risk-taking but also increases the manager’s effort choice. 
Although the resulting model implies that infinite leverage is optimal, we argue this is 
hardly implausible as most banks would have extremely high leverage (possibly even 
higher than current level) were there no capital requirements.
In conclusion, the chapter introduces endogenous volatility and leverage to a one- 
period principal-agent model. Our results show that leverage is negatively related to 
incentives when volatility cost is low, which has some empirical support, e.g Guay 
[1999]. Also, leverage has a positive relationship with incentives when the manager 
is not very risk-averse, consistent with Coles et al. [2006]. We argue that this is due 
to managers’ action choice not being explicitly considered in most empirical studies. 
Besides the complex relation mentioned in the literature, we show that even when 
bondholder-shareholder agency cost is absent, the incentive-leverage relationship is still 
ambiguous. Unless managerial actions are explicitly considered, empirical studies are 
likely to find mixed results.
A useful extension of the original model would be to explicitly incorporate firm 
bankruptcy. Two features can be added to the model in order to accommodate this 
feature. Firstly, as we previously discussed, the manager’s utility becomes infinitely 
negative when firm has positive probability of failure. One way to avoid infinity is to 
allow the manager to have outside wealth, so that, even if the firm fails, the manager’s 
wealth is strictly positive. The second problem with original model is that the firm 
chooses infinite leverage when the manager has debt compensation. This problem can 
also be avoided by introducing a fractional bankruptcy cost, similar to Leland [1994] 
and Leland and Toft [1996], so that there is penalty cost to additional leverage, which 
bounds shareholders’ leverage choice. Cadenillas et al. [2004] claim that the numerical 
solution is not available for the bankruptcy problem mentioned above. It would be very 
interesting to revisit their claim with these added features.
It would be very interesting to investigate a version of the problem where bondholder- 
shareholder conflict is present. Our setup assumes that leverage has a simple impact 
on the firm asset value, that is scaling up of the firm’s size. It would be interesting to 
account for agency conflict involved between bondholders and shareholders. In such a 
setting, shareholders would choose incentives to balance agency cost between the man­
ager and bondholders. Another interesting extension would be to introduce outside 
investment options for the managers. If the manager has other investment options,
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Executive Compensation with  
Tax
3.1 Introduction
Employee stock options and restricted stock grants are subject to a variety of tax laws. 
These tax considerations could potentially have a substantial effect on the optimal 
exercise (or sale of these grants) and the value of the grants to the employee. Subject 
to qualifying constraints, Incentive Stock Options (ISO) in the US, and Enterprise 
Management Incentives (EMI) and Company Share Option Plans (CSOP) in the UK 
offer the employee the chance to pay long-term capital gains tax on their profits from 
option exercise. Naturally, these plans may be more valuable to the employee than 
other forms of compensation, keeping the cost of compensation to the firm fixed. We 
develop a continuous time utility model where, by carefully considering the optimal 
exercise and sale for the employee, we are able to derive the employee’s valuation of 
the option and the cost to the firm of issuing the option.
In the UK, for most reasonable levels of wealth and risk aversion, EMIs and CSOPs 
provide the largest value to an employee given a fixed cost to the firm. This is largely 
because in the UK, the firm is able to deduct the employee’s option payoff from their 
corporate taxable income. However, the result is not true for all employees, as em­
ployees with high levels of risk aversion or low levels of wealth would prefer to exercise 
the options before meeting the tax qualifying conditions and thus forgo the potential 
tax savings. In the US, payouts from ISOs are not corporate tax deductible, thus, for
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reasonable levels of effective corporate tax, ISOs are the least effective form of compen­
sation considered as they provide the lowest value to the employee for a given cost to 
the firm.
The other compensation contracts considered are stock options that do not qualify 
for the potentially lower tax rate; these are called nonqualified stock options (NQSO) in 
the US and unapproved option plans (UOP) in the UK. Payoffs from these options are 
taxed as regular income when the option is exercised, and are eligible for corporate tax 
deduction. We also consider restricted stock plans. These are taxed as regular income 
at the date of issuance even though they cannot be sold until the vesting period. It is 
often possible for employees to make a Section 83b election, allowing them to defer the 
tax payment until the stock vests. We value the restricted stock plans by considering 
the possibility of a Section 83b election.
Our findings are in agreement with McDonald [2004] in that making the 83b election 
reduces the value of the restricted stock grant to the employee. Blouin and Carter [2007] 
argue that an 83b election increases employee incentives. But their analysis is based on 
a particular scenario, that is stock price goes up in the future. With no assumption on 
future stock price, our results show that 83b election also lowers employee incentives, 
in particular the pay-for-performance measure. 16 Given non-optimality of this election, 
there appears to be little rational justification of the 83b election for either the employee 
or the firm.
Stock options have become an important instrument for rewarding employees in 
recent years, but no agreement has been reached in the research community as to why 
granting options is such a popular practice. Economic theories propose some possible 
explanations: providing incentive to employees (Hall and Murphy [2002]), providing 
non-debt tax  shield (Graham [2003]), employee optimism (Oyer and Schaefer [2005]) 
and employee retention (Oyer [2004]); none of these explanations could single-handedly 
explain the wide popularity of the board-based option plan. There is also an ongoing 
debate regarding the best type of compensation instruments — stocks or options. Prior 
literature, such as Hall and Murphy [2002] and Dittmann and Maug [2007], argue that 
it is not optimal to reward options as compensation because they are an inefficient way 
of rewarding employees. Despite these conclusions, firms continue to use options in 
their compensation plans.
16Pay-for-performance, incentives and A are all interchangeable terms.
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Thus, as well as determining the value and cost of issuance, we also consider the 
incentives provided by the plans, in particular the pay-for-performance measure. We 
find that in the UK cost effective incentives are best provided by EMIs and CSOPs 
in line with the intention of creating such plans. In the US, ISOs provide the least 
cost-effective incentives, unless the corporate tax rate is very low. This is a surprising 
result, given that the tax breaks for ISOs were seemingly designed to provide incentives 
to employees. This result may imply that only loss making firms choose to issue ISOs 
or that employees are extracting benefits from the firm.
Finally, we look at the expected lifetimes of the options. Any incentives provided 
by option plans only last as long as the grant is held by the employee and so this is 
an important consideration. Also, empirical corporate finance research (for example, 
Malmendier and Tate [2005]) is interested in when options are exercised as it may 
be possible to infer certain behavioral biases or inside information from employee be­
haviour. It is well known in the literature that employees exercise compensation options 
earlier than they would with otherwise traded options, e.g. Carpenter et al. [2010]. This 
is because employees are risk averse and suffer trading restriction. However, pricing and 
exercising also depends upon tax planning. We find that the incentive feature typically 
causes employees to exercise their options earlier because they expect to hold stocks 
(obtained from exercising ISOs) one more year for tax purposes, hence they exercise 
the option earlier to reduce total holding time.
The implications of these findings are that tax considerations are very important 
in determining the value and optimal exercise strategy for the employees. In the UK, 
due to the favorable taxation of EMIs and CSOPs, the optimal compensation contract 
typically consists of these incentive option plans, even when not considering pay-for- 
performance incentives. In the US, due to unfavorable tax rules, ISOs are not a cost- 
effective way of paying employees or providing incentives unless companies are not 
paying corporate tax, or the effective rate is very low. We find that, depending upon 
the type of option contract, the optimal exercise decision can be substantially different, 
with ISOs typically being exercised earlier than NQSOs; when attempting to calibrate 
models to observed option data this is an important consideration. Finally, we find 
little justification for the offering of a Section 83b election for restricted stock plans.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 outlines tax and accounting 
rules in the US and UK. Section 3.3 introduces the valuation model for various com­
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pensation instruments and discusses the incentives provided. Section 3.4 reports our 
results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 US and UK  tax rules
3 .2 .1  S to ck  o p tio n
There are primarily two ways that firms in the US can grant employees stock options: 
ISOs and NQSOs. ISOs are not commonly used in practice. According to Hall and 
Liebman [2000], ISOs only account for 5 percent of total option grants. They are not 
popular because of two major reasons. 17 First, there is a $100,000 limit on ISOs that 
an employee can acquire during each calendar year. But few firms grant up to this 
limit potentially because of the second reason: the cost of ISO is not deductible against 
corporate tax. It is simply a costly form of compensation. For an employee, the ISO is 
not taxed at grant and exercise date. It is only taxed when the employee sells the stock, 
and at a lower capital gains tax rate. The ISO is tax advantageous to the employee 
but costly to the issuing firm.
NQSOs are widely used in the US. While NQSOs are similar to ISOs by design, 
they have some flexible features that make them very attractive to firms. Firstly 
NQSOs can be awarded to anyone -  employees, executives, consultants, etc. Second, 
although NQSOs holders are taxed at an income tax rate at exercise date, issuing firms 
receive a parallel deduction against corporate income at the same time. NQSO is tax 
advantageous to the issuing firm but costly to its recipient. Table 3.1 shows detailed 
tax rules for each of these option granting schemes.
In the UK, there are similar schemes that provide favorable tax treatment to em­
ployees: EMI and CSOP18 which are taxed similarly to ISO in the US. The tax rules 
on those option schemes are quite detailed and have different qualifying condition. 19
17Hall and Liebman [2000] report ISO account for 5% of total option grant in public firms. 
According to  a survey conducted by Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1999, ISO accounts for 
31.2% of to ta l stock option grant in private industry. The survey report is available online at:
http://w w vv.b ls.gov/opub/cw c/arch ive/spring2001artl.pdf
18HM Revenue & Custom s provides detailed (and quite technical) tax rules on each of these option  
schemes. T hey are online at: http://wvvw.hm rc.gov.uk/m anuals/essum /ESSUM 40000.htm
19EM Is are aiming at small firms that have gross assets under £30 million and subject to  £120,000  
per employee lim its and £3  million limit for all employees. CSOPs are taxed the same way as EMIs but 
have more restrictions. Under CSOP scheme, any employee can hold qualifying options for no more 
than £30,000. CSOPs is only vested 3 years after grant, exercising CSOP options less than 3 year of 
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3. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION WITH TAX
Similar to ISOs in the US, employees are not taxed a,t the grant or exercise date but at 
the long-term capital gains rate when employees sell the shares. The crucial difference 
between ISOs and EMIs however is that firms get a corporate tax deduction when em­
ployees exercise an EMI or CSOP option. In addition to the EMI/CSOP, the UK has 
its equivalent of NQSO, which is called UOP. It is taxed in the same way as an NQSO.
Apart from ISOs and NQSOs, and EMIs and CSOPs, there are also the employee 
stock purchase plan (ESPP) in the US and save as you earn (SAYE) options scheme 
in the UK, which offer option grants to employees. Both schemes require employees to 
make savings toward future exercise of the granted options. ESPPs are taxed similar 
to ISOs where firms cannot take a tax deduction. SAYE is taxed similar to EMIs and 
CSOPs, where firms also get corporate tax deductions for share benefit provided under 
this scheme.
3 .2 .2  R e s tr ic te d  stock
For employees, restricted stock plans are subject to the income tax rate when the stock 
vests. It is not taxed at date of grant unless the employee chooses to make an 83b 
election. Firms receive corporate tax deduction for granting restricted stocks. Under 
an 83b election, the employee pays income tax upon grant and capital gains tax upon 
the sale of stock. Restricted stock plans are taxed the same in the UK and the US; 
there are also equivalent rules in the UK that provide similar 83b election.
3 .2 .3  R e la tiv e  ta x  advantage
Typically from a valuation point of view, stock options are inefficient because they 
provide less value to employees for the same dollar outlay (see Hall and Murphy [2002]). 
For US companies paying corporate tax, ISOs are less efficient than NQSOs since they 
do not attract any corporate tax deduction, leading to a larger cost of issuance. To 
illustrate the point, consider the employee’s valuation of the stock is P  and the market 
valuation of the stock is P. For a risk-averse employee with restricted stock, P  < P,
P ^  ~ tA  < 1 ~ I L  (3.1)
P( 1 -  TC) 1 -  Tc
where tc and 77  are the corporate and income tax rates, respectively. The right hand 
side is the value to cost ratio of cash compensation. The left hand side represents
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value to cost ratio for restricted stock. From this simple inequality, restricted stock 
provides less value to the employee (for the same amount of dollar outlay) than cash 
compensation .20 Since cost of restricted stock is not affected by sales behaviour (option 
cost is affected by exercise behaviour), cash will always dominate restricted stock in 
terms of value to the employee per dollar spent by the firm.
A slightly different argument can be applied to ISOs and NQSOs at exercise time;
P - X  ( P - X M I - t A ,
P  -  X  < (P -  A) ( l  -  rc ) P < TC (3-2)
X  is the strike price of stock options. The fraction, jf p x » *s ^ ie PaY°ff ratio of ISOs, 
where the numerator is the payoff the employee receives when exercising the option, 
since the risk averse employee values stock at P. The denumerator is simply the 
company’s cash outlay at exercised date for granting ISOs. The right hand side of the 
equation is the payoff ratio of NQSOs. This inituitive result leads to a well known 
result (e.g. Graham [2003]) that when the corporate tax rate is higher than the income 
tax rate, NQSOs are preferred to ISOs.
It is also straightforward to show that restricted stock is preferred to NQSOs,
max(P -  X, 0)(1 -  rj) P(1 -  t } )
max(P -  X, 0)(1 -  tc) P(1 -  tc)
This relation holds for any tax rate. From the above simple analysis, we show that cash
has the largest payoff ratio, followed by restricted stock, then NQSO, at last ISO. The 
same argument also applies to UK option plans, where EMI/CSOP has payoff ratio,
P - X (3.4)
( P - X ) ( 1 - T C)
It is unclear if this ratio is larger than that of cash (and also that of restricted stock), 
as it depends on income tax rate as well as the employee’s risk aversion. Our more 
elaborate model in section 3.4 shows that these relations (shown above) hold for current 
US and UK tax rates.
Although these inequalities are a good approximation of each instruments’ relative 
tax advantage, they are not value to cost ratio we show in later section, which is
20N ote we use a simplifying assumption that income tax for the employee is Prr, actually her income 
tax  is equal to P n ,  though it does not affect the direction of the inequality.
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more accurate at describing the employee’s problem. Section 3 .4  shows that exercise 
behaviour, capital gains tax, risk aversion and wealth are also important in determining 
relative tax advantage. In fact, section 3.4.5 demonstrate that NQSOs can be preferred 
even if the income tax rate is substantially higher than the corporate tax rate. It is 
also worth noting that the above analysis does not consider the incentives provided by 
the compensation instruments either, which as we will show are important reasons of 
their popularity.
3.3 The m odel
In this section, we develop the tax inclusive pricing model. There a.re two major 
additions to the standard partial differential equation (PDE) pricing technique (see 
Carpenter [1998], Carpenter et al. [2010] and Pollet et al. [2011]). Firstly, the model 
incorporates tax payments into the executive’s and firm’s option valuation, by adjusting 
expiry and exercise conditions of the appropriate PDE. Secondly, upon exercising the 
option, the employee receives a stock that may incur additional tax payments once it 
has been sold. The stock sale decision could incur short-term capital gains, long-term 
capital gains or income tax depending upon the option plan. This stock sale decision 
is equivalent to the exercise of an option with a zero strike price and so is modeled as 
an embedded option. The value and cost of a compensation option (ISO21 or NQSO) 
depends upon the decision to exercise the option, the decision to exercise the stock 
and also the tax payable at the point of exercise and sale. As usual, exercise and sale 
decisions depend upon employee characteristics such as liquid wealth and risk aversion.
Consistent with the standard executive stock option literature (e.g., Kulatilaka and 
Marcus [1994]; Carpenter [1998]; Hall and Murphy [2 0 0 2 ]) we use a terminal wealth 
power utility model (the model in Chapter 2 also uses the same utility function). As 
shown by Lambert et al. [1991] the employee's value is different from the firm s valuation 
as the employee faces a large non-diversifiable risk. Conversely, the firm s shareholders 
are fully diversified. We first determine the employee’s optimal exercise strategy and her 
valuation, then separately calculate the firm’s value of the option under the risk-neutral 
measure using the employee’s exercise strategy.
21 In the following analysis we will use ISO to also mean CSOP or EMI, unless otherwise specified.
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The employee has constant relative risk aversion and is granted an option22 at time 
0 . Exercise decisions are taken to maximize the utility of wealth, IT, at the maturity 
of the options T . The utility of wealth at this time is given by:
w 1-^
U(W)  =   ------  (3.5)1-7
where 7  is the coefficient of risk aversion. The employee invests all of the non-option 
wealth in the riskless asset. So, that
dWt = rWtdt (3.6)
where r is the risk-free rate. The stock price, P , follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dPt — fiPtdt +  crPtdZt (3.7)
where p, and a are the mean and volatility of the stock price return respectively and 
dZ  is a Brownian motion. To make the executive rationally select the riskless portfolio, 
the expected return of the stock price is chosen to be equal to the risk-free rate, ji =  r.
Note that although unrealistic, this constraint retains the key features of the full 
portfolio allocation and option exercise problem, without the increased complexity of 
including a market asset. If the CAPM holds and the executive is allowed to hold 
a market asset, then it would not be optimal to allocate any wealth to the stock. 
Instead, wealth would be optimally allocated to the market asset as it dominates the 
stock. W ithout the market asset, imposing the restriction that (i =  r ensures that there 
is no desire for the executive to hold stock and that the executive’s desire to hold the 
option is only due to the possibility that the option could produce a large payoff.
Additionally, as we are also considering the sale of stock after exercise, choosing 
ji > r without a market asset leads to the employee having additional reasons (other 
than tax savings) to hold the stock. In the presence of a market asset, if the stock is 
priced according to CAPM then the market asset would be a preferable asset to hold 
unless the tax savings of holding the stock are substantial. As above, choosing (i = r
22We consider restricted stock as an option with zero exercise price.
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To Tv Te(T) T. (TS)
Grant Vesting Exercise (Expiry) Stock Sale (Max Waiting)
•First stage ■ Second stage
Figure 3.1: Timeline of the valuation model. This figure demonstrates the timeline 
of the valuation model. Two choice variables are in the model; they are optimal exercise 
time, rfi and optimal sell time, rs. The employee optimally chooses both times to maximise 
expected terminal utility. The first stage is the conventional utility-based pricing model 
where the employee optimally exercises the option to maximize expected terminal utility. 
The maximum exercise time is option’s expiry, T. The first stage ends once the option is 
exercised. The second stage is where the employee optimally decides to sell the stock. Ts 
is the maximum waiting time after the option exercise, as the tax benefit of waiting ends 
on that date. Stock is always sold at Ts if not already sold early. The second stage ends 
once the stock is sold. The model then works backward in time from rs or Ts and solve 
stock value at exercise date, re. Then backward to solve option value at grant date, Tq.
retains this feature, as without tax considerations the employee would prefer to invest 
in the risk-free asset.
We model the employee exercise decision as a two-stage problem, in the first stage 
the employee chooses when to exercise the option and buy the stock at strike price; at 
the second stage the employee chooses when to sell the stock at the market price. As 
usual with PDE methods, we work backwards in time to price the employee’s stock in 
the second stage, and then use this value to determine the employee’s option price in 
the first stage. Naturally, both of these decisions depend 011 the appropriate tax rate as 
well as employee and stock characteristics. Figure 3.1 shows the timeline of the model.
3 .3 .1  S econ d  stage
Since the model allows exercise in stages, wealth cannot be eliminated as a state vari­
able. Note that once the option holding has been exercised, the terminal wealth can 
only be determined by knowing the sale time. We consider the second stage problem 
first where the employee has already exercised the option and holds a share of the firm 
stock. The employee chooses to sell the stock to maximize expected terminal utility. We 
use S{W t ,P t ,t) to denote the employee’s value function, then her goal is to maximize
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the expected utility of time Ts (= re + Tw ) wealth,
S(Pt, Wt , t) =  max Et S* (WT. + K r, , r s) (3.8)
Where ts is the optimal selling time for the stock. S* is the indirect utility once stock 
has been sold, its functional form is derived below. K Ts is the payoff from selling the 
stock which depends on value of rs as we will see below. The final possible date for 
sale is Ts which is the option exercise date re plus the waiting time (TV) before the 
tax benefit can be taken. Typically, after 1 year has elapsed there is no tax benefit to 
hold the share and it will automatically be sold, so TV =  1 for this stage.
In the absence of the sale, the value function S  (at the risk of ambiguity, we suppress 
its arguments and subscripts for concision) satisfies the following Bellman equation,
where the subscripts denote partial differentiation with respect to each argument. This 
leads to the no-sale partial differential equation,
After the stock has been sold, the executive’s problem is reduced to investing in liquid 
wealth. The employee’s Bellman equation in this case is
Since W  follows a non-stochastic process, the employee’s PDE is reduced to,
Stdt + rW Sw dt + fiPSpdt + T 2 P'2 d:t =  0 (3.9)
Si + r W S w  + jiPSp + T p 'pSpp  =  0 (3.10)
E t S;dt + S'w dW  + ^ S ‘w w (dW)2 = 0 (3.11)
s ;  + rW S h  =  0 (3.12)
it can be easily verified that the problem has the solution,
( l - T r ( T s - t ) W t  7
1 - 7 (3.13)
61
3. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION WITH TAX
Typically the tax benefits of the ISO are not realized if the stock is sold within one year 
of exercise and then all profits from the option are taxed at income tax rates. After one 
year of exercise, then for ISOs option profits are taxed at the long-term capital gains 
rate. The sale of the stock means that the employee receives X  and pays capital gains
tax (tcg) on the (positive difference) between Pt and X .  At Ts , the terminal condition
S ( P Ts, W Ts, T S ) =  K T s ) ^1-7
where K ts is payoff from selling the stock,
, p Ts  if P t s  <  X
K Ts = {  5 (3.15)
( l - T g c ) ( P t s - X )  +  X  i f  P T s > X
The employee sell the stock at Ts because there is no longer any tax benefit associated 
with waiting. Since the riskless asset provides same return, holding risky stock is simply 
not optimal.
Prior to Ts  it is still possible to sell the stock early but here the employee has to
pay income tax, 7 7 , on any options profits. So at time t < Ts, it is optimal for the
employee to sell the stock early if
S ( P l , W t , t ) < S , { W t  +  K t , t )  (3.16)
where now Kt is payoff from selling the stock before Ts,
, Pt if P t < X
K t = {  (3.17)
( 1  -  n ) (P t -  x )  p  x  if Pt > x
Thus, on early sale S{Pt, Wt, t) = One thing to note is that as the payoff
is always Pt if the stock price falls below X ,  it is always optimal to sell early as there is 
no tax benefit from holding the stock. Following Lambert et al. [1991] the employee’s 
stock value can be calculated by considering the certainty equivalent. From equation 
(3.10) we can find the executive’s value function S{Pt ,W t , t ) and from equation (3.13)




Ptax(Pt,Wt,t) = ( ( 1 - 7 ) e - il- ^ 1<Ts- ^ S { P t , W t , t ) ^  - W  (3.18)
The value Ptax{Pt,Wt,t) is the employee’s valuation of the stock at the point of ex­
ercising when the stock price is Pt and the employee has liquid wealth Wt. As this 
expression will also be used in the first stage of the problem, this is a crucial input into 
the option exercise decision in the next subsection.
It is tempting to think that we have to work out this second stage for all options 
and restricted stock plans considered. In the case of NQSOs, the holder of the stock 
can choose to sell the stock immediately, incurring no extra tax payments, or to hold 
the stock potentially for up to one year where any profits from holding the stock incur, 
long-term capital gains. However, in this scenario the employee has already paid income 
tax from the payoff of the option and so there is no additional tax saving to be made 
from holding the stock any further. For this reason, it is always sold in place of the
risk-free rate as soon as the option is exercised. Thus we do not need to consider the
second stage for these options.
Similarly, with restricted stock, once the stock vests, the employee pays income 
tax on the value Ptv at the vesting date. At this point they could hold the stock for 
another year, paying only long-term capital gains on the profits, but they could also 
sell the stock and invest in the risk-free asset, which is a superior investment. Thus,
for restricted stock, we also do not need to consider the second stage.
3 .3 .2  F irst stage
Now we consider the first stage of our option pricing formula -  where the employee still 
holds an unexercised option. As before, the employee maximizes expected terminal 
utility. Similar to the second stage problem, we now assume that the employee’s val­
uation function is V(W t,Pt ,t), which is a function of the employee’s wealth, the stock 
price, and time. Formally,
V(Pu Wt , I) = max Et [V* (WTe + Ptax(FrB, Wre.re) -  X , re)] (3.19)
T e€[Tv,T \
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Where re is option’s optimal exercise time, Ty  is the vesting period of the option, T  
is maturity of the option. Pt,ax(PTe, WTe, re) is value of the stock obtained from second 
stage, it represents value of the stock to the risk-averse employee given an optimal sale 
strategy. V* is the employee’s valuation function defined in equation (3.22).
In this case, the employee’s portfolio consists of W  invested in the risk free asset 
and the stock option. This is different from the second stage where the employee has 
one stock. Similar to the second stage problem, in the absence of exercise the valuation 
function V  satisfies the Bellman equation,
Vtdt +  rWV\ydt  +  /iPVpdt  +  ^ a2P 2Vppdt = 0 (3.20)
so the no-exercise partial differential equation is
Vt +  rW Vw  +  [i-PVp +  \ c2P 2Vpp  =  0 (3.21)
Analogously to the second stage problem, once the option has been exercised the value 
function is,
V*{Wu t) =  - (3.22)
Upon exercise the employee pays the strike price X  and receives a stock which can be 
sold at any future time. For an ISO we have determined the value of the stock to the 
employee in the previous subsection as Ptax{PtiWt,t). So it is optimal to exercise the 
option if
V(Pr. ,W Tc,Te) <  1/* (Wr. +  Aa*(-Pr, , Wr„ , Te) ~ X ,  Te) (3-23)
At maturity (time T), the terminal condition for the value function is,
V(Pt ,W t ,T)  = V*(WT + max(Ptax(JPr, Wt ,T)  -  X , 0 ) , T ) . (3.24)
as here the option will only be exercised if Ptax(Pr> Wt ,T )  — X  > 0.
The value of the option to the employee can again be determined by considering 
the certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent of a option is the riskless amount
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the employee is willing to give up at time t =  0, so
V*(WQ +  C, 0) =  V(Pq, Wq, 0) (3.25)
where C  is the value of option. Based on equation (3.22) and (3.25), the ISO price can 
be obtained,
Ciso{P,W)  =  ((1 - 7 ) e - (1- ' )rTF (P 0,W o,0 ))I r ’ -  WB. (3.26)
3.3.2.1 NQ SO s and restricted stock
NQSOs have slightly different early exercise and terminal conditions as tax is paid at 
the point of exercise rather than when the stock is sold. As such, the early exercise is 
optimal (where re is an exercise time) if
V(PT. , WT' , Te)  < V * {WT, +  (1 - T,) (PT. -  X ) + , T „ )  (3.27)
where r j  is the income tax rate. For the same reasons before, NQSOs are already taxed 
at option exercise date; it is simply not optimal to hold stock any longer. The stock is 
sold immediately after the option exercise. Hence the stock is valued at Pt rather than 
Aax(-Pt) W*,i), as it is already settled in cash. At expiry, a similar condition applies,
V(PT , Wt ,T)  -  7* (WT +  (1 -  tt)(Pt  -  X ) +, T ) . (3.28)
and ^
Cm so(P, W)  =  ((1 -  7 )e - (1" 7),'r V(P0, W 'o .O ))^  -  W0. (3.29)
For restricted stock it depends upon whether the 83b election has been selected or 
not. In the absence of an 83b election, as soon as the stock vests, the employee pays 
income tax. Sale is not possible before the vesting date. The restricted stock price then 
satisfies equation (3.10) with terminal condition
S(Ptv , WTv, TV) =  {WTv +  Pl V^ ~  T 7 (3-30)
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where Ty is the vesting period for the stock. Thus the current value of this restricted 
stock is given by
^No83b(P, W) =  ((1 -  - f ) e - ^ rTvS{P0, W0, 0)) ^  - W o  (3.31)
The problem is slightly more complex when the employee makes a 83b election.
Assume the stock is awarded at the initial price of Pq. The employee’s valuation
function, S(Pt, Wt, /.), is the same as that of a standard restricted stock. Similar to 
equation (3.30), the terminal condition of a 83b elected restricted stock is,
S(Prv ,W Tv,Tv ) =  S*(WTv + PTv -  tCG{Ptv ~ Po)+,Tv ) (3.32)
where S* is valuation function defined in equation (3.13), Ty is the vesting date, at 
which the stock is sold. At issuance the value of the restricted stock is
Ps3b(P, W) = ((1 -  7 )e -(1“T)r3VS(-Po, Wo, 0)) A  -  Wo -  t,P 0 (3.33)
This result is slightly different from that of equation (3.31), as the last term t/P o is 
income tax paid on the initial stock price.
3 .3 .3  F ir m ’s va lu a tion
Shareholders of the firm’s are well diversified investors and so it is appropriate to value 
the option from their perspective by using a risk-neutral approach. The firm’s valuation 
determines the stock option cost; it is also the amount of the grant that is expensed 
in the firm’s income statement. Denote the risk neutral value by F. In the absence of 
exercise, the proportional drift of F  under the risk-neutral measure is equal to the risk 
free rate,
E Q[dF]=rFdt  (3.34)
As exercise is dependent upon the employee’s wealth, W , the firm’s cost also depends 




Ft + rW F w  +  PFP +  i a2P 2FPP -  r F  =  0 (3.35)
The exercise strategy is determined by the employee’s optimization problem outlined
in the previous sections. At an exercise time t for particular values of W  and P  then
F{PuWu t) =  (Pt -  X ) + -  Y r c (Pt -  X ) + (3.36)
Where tq is corporate tax rate. Y  is the indicator function defined in equation (3.37)
below. /
1 if the option is NQSO
(3.37)
0 if the option is ISO
Y  =  I
The firm receives a tax deduction when an NQSO is exercised, but no deduction is
available for ISO exercises. Smooth pasting conditions do not apply here because
exercise is chosen to maximize the employee’s value function V  and not to minimize F. 
In other words, the exercise boundary is exogenous to the valuation model. For this 
reason, F  is not necessarily continuously differentiable in W  or P , although it must be 
continuous. The terminal condition for the PDE is
F(Pt , W t, T) =  (PT -  X ) + -  Y tc (Pt  -  X ) + (3.38)
3 .3 .4  E x p ec te d  tim e  to  exercise
We also calculate the expected lifetime of the entire option grant, 6. The expected 
lifetime represents the time until the compensation has expired or been exercised. In 
the absence of expiry, exercise, 9, follows a martingale. This is because without exercise, 
6 always equals option maturity, T.
E[d9} = 0 (3.39)
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The corresponding PDE is
+  rWOur +  liPOp +  -cr2P 20pp = 0 (3.40)
If (-Pt-s W' fs t )  is a. point on the exercise boundary, then the lifetime of the option is known
with certainty and so
At expiry the option lifetime is also- known with certainty and so the terminal condition
for the PDE is known.
For restricted stock, expected time to exercise is equal to vesting period because holding 
stock does not provide higher return. Pollet et al. [2-011] use the same measure to 
compute option expected lifetime.
3.3 .5  T ax deduction
Option exercises offer firms an important non-debt tax shield. As firms can carry tax 
losses two years backwards as well as 20 years forward, deduction of option exercise 
can be realized in any year of the 22-year period or not realized at all if firms have a 
huge amount of other deductions. Actual ex post tax effects also depend on other firm 
characteristics. It is extremely difficult to know this ‘deduction profit’ beforehand, for 
example Graham et al. [2004] develop a simulation model to forecast tax deduction. For 
simplicity, we assume th a t the deductions of option exercise are recognized in the same 
year the option is exercised. Partially recognizing deduction throughout the 22-year 
period would have limited effect on our results, unless marginal corporate tax  rate is a 
function of tax deduction.
3.3 .6  M easure m etrics
To evaluate the effectiveness of different compensation instruments, we use three mea­
surement metrics to  compare the incentives provided by different compensation pack­
ages.. The first metric measures how much the executive's valuation differs from the
shareholders issuance cost. Due to trading restriction and taxation, the employee’s
(3.41)
H P t ,W t ,T)  = T (3.42)
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valuation is different from cost incurred by the company. We divide the subjective 
valuation of the employee to the company’s cost. This gives a ratio,
The higher this ratio is, the more effective the compensation instrument is. Since both 
value and cost prices are after tax, it is natural to compare the efficiency ratio of options 
with that of a cash salary; we define the cash ratio as follows,
The higher the cash ratio, the higher income the employee gets for each dollar the 
company paid. As both company and employees are not tax neutral, different types of 
compensation instruments have different efficiency.
In addition to the efficiency measure, the second metric measures the incentive 
effects of the compensation package. We compute delta option value which is the rate of 
change of the employee’s grant value with respect to changes in the stock price. Scaling 
delta by the company cost, then we know how much incentive each compensation 
instrument is providing per dollar/pound. This gives
and dP  is a small change in the stock price. The higher the delta metric, the more 
incentives are provided for each dollar.
While the first two metrics measure the incentive and risk-taking effects of the com­
pensation package, the final metric considers the expected lifetime of the compensation 
package. The analysis of retention should not be independent of the cost incurred, so 
we again scale expected time to exercise with company issuance cost.
Efficiency Metric = V{X,  Wp, 0) 
F ( X , W 0,Q)
(3.43)
Cash ratio = --------







A (X W 0,0) =







3. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION WITH TAX
This is considered as a proxy for how many years of retention the firm buys for each 
dollar that it spends. For restricted stock, this metric is very easy to compute as stocks 
have expected time to exercise equal to vesting period.
For options, the metric directly relates to wealth, as both 9 and F  are functions 
of W . In addition to direct dependence on wealth, 9 will be high when the employee 
has high wealth, because wealth reduces risk aversion and delays value destroying early 
exercise. The employee’s exercise choice then feeds back into the firm’s valuation, 
increases the option’s cost. Therefore, there is a positive correlation between 9 and F.
The positive correlation biases the retention metric downward. This is due to risk 
aversion effect on both value of 9 and F. When the employee is risk neutral, correlation 
between 9 and F  reduces to zero. In this case 9 equals maturity of the option and F  
equals Black-Scholes value. As risk aversion increases, correlation between 9 and F  
increases, and both values of 9 and F  go down. However, risk aversion has larger 
impact on 9, which resulted its value to drop faster than F,  similar effects are also 
observed for efficiency and delta metrics, see. Figures 3.2, 3.4. So the retention metric 
reduces as correlation between the two increases. Although the positive correlation 
biases the ‘retention’ effect, it still provides a general indication as to how much the 
firm is paying for the options’ expected life.
3.4 R esults and discussion
3.4.1 P aram eter choice
We set firm volatility equal to 30% which is roughly the median volatility of executive 
stock option issuers from Carpenter [1998]. The risk free rate, r, is assumed to be equal 
to 4% and T, the time to expiration, equal to 10 years following Carpenter [1998] and 
Hall and Murphy [2002]. The vesting period, Ty  is set to 3 years following a 1999 survey 
by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics which reports that ‘3 years was the average period 
needed for full grant vesting’.^  In addition to the basic parameters of the firm stock, 
we assume personal income tax rate, 77 , is equal to 0.33 which is currently the highest 
marginal tax rate in the US. Corporate tax rate, rc, is assumed to be 0.35, it is also the 
highest tax rate for corporations. Long-term capital gains tax tqg is assumed to be
23Report available at: http://w w w .bls.gG v/opub/cw c/archive/spring2001artl.pdf
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0.15. For simplicity we assume short-term capital gains rate is equal to the employee’s 
income tax rate. For UK options, we use a similar assumption where all tax rates 
are from the highest tranche; according to HM Revenue & Customs, these rates are 
tj = 0.5, r c =  0.28 and tcg — 0.28. All options in the chapter are at-the-money with 
an initial stock price Pq — 1. We consider a range of starting liquid wealth from 0.25 
to 5, which is a reasonable approximate of the employee’s outside wealth (e.g. Hall and 
Murphy [2000, 2002] and Carpenter et al. [2010]).
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Figure 3.2: Efficiency metric. This figure plots the efficiency metric for at-the-money 
ISOs, NQSOs and restricted stock. The plot on the left has low volatility, a = 0.3 and 
the plot 011 the right has high volatility, a = 0.5. Other parameter values are: initial stock 
price, P0 = 1, risk free rate, r = 0.04, time to maturity, T  = 10, vesting period, Ty — 3, 
stock price return, p, = 0.04, stock price volatility, a = 0.3, income tax rate, 77 — 0.33, 
capital gains tax, tcg — 0-15, corporate tax rate, rc = 0.35
It is without doubt that ISOs are valued higher than NQSOs; see Table 3.2, for 
example, where ISO values are consistently higher than their respective NQSOs. Even 
though the employee values ISO at a high level, it is more costly for the firm to issue. All 
ISOs costs shown in Table 3.2 are higher than NQSOs’ costs. Although the employee 
is heavily taxed for receiving an NQSO, the amount that is taxable to the employees is 
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3.4 Results and discussion
That is why NQSOs have far higher efficiency ratios than those of ISOs (see Figure 
3.2).
Restricted stock has the highest value and the cost out of the three forms of com­
pensation instruments. Furthermore, it is equivalent to options with zero strike price. 
From a value and cost perspective, restricted stock has the highest efficiency ratio (Fig­
ure 3.2). This result is consistent with the view that restricted stock is the optimal 
form of compensation (Hall and Murphy [2002], Dittmann and Maug [2007]) and also 
with our prior analysis in section 3.2.3. However, if firms give compensation based 
on efficiency, they may do so by giving the employee cash instead, because per dol­
lar cost, cash provides the highest efficiency ratio. But cash provides no incentives to 
the employee. Judging the best form of compensation depends on other measurement 
metrics.
Since employee valuation of stock options is utility based, it heavily depends on 
the employee’s risk aversion. For example, in Figure 3.3 ISOs efficiency ratio changes 
considerably across different risk aversion. It is also worth noting that since ISOs 
issuing cost is not tax deductible, its efficiency ratio does not depend on corporate 
tax rate (section 3.4.5 has more detail on this). So cash may not have the highest 
efficiency ratio. Figure 3.3 also plots value and cost ratio when the employee is risk 
neutral at 7  — 0. As expected, the ratio does not change with wealth as risk neutral 
employee’s preference does not depend on wealth level. The value to cost ratio stays at 
0.85, because both the employee and the firm are risk neutral. They all treat the ISO 
position as cash, since the risk neutral employee always sold the stock late to enjoy a 
favourable capital gains tax rate. The value to cost ratio is merely , which equals 
0.85 for tax rates reported in Figure 3.3.
3 .4 .3  D e lta  m etric
Even though options have the lowest efficiency ratio (ISO being the worst), they out­
perform cash and restricted stock in the delta metric. At high wealth, NQSOs provide 
the highest incentives per dollar cost, followed by ISOs, then restricted stock. At low 
wealth, restricted stock has the highest delta metric. At high volatility (Figure 3.4, 
right plot), the delta metric for all instruments drops. This is because a risk averse em­
ployee discounts risky instruments, so that value decreases with volatility. Firm cost,
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Figure 3.3: ISO with no corporate tax . This figure plots efficiency metrics for at-the- 
money TSOs with different risk aversion. The corporate tax rate is set to zero (rc = 0) in 
the figure. Other parameter values are: initial stock price, P0 = 1, risk free rate, r = 0.04, 
time to maturity, T  = 10, vesting period, Ty = 3, stock price return, n = 0.04, stock price 
volatility, a = 0.3, income tax rate, 7 7  = 0.33, capital gains tax, tcg  = 0-15.
on the other hand, is computed based on risk-neutrality, and increases with volatility. 
The combined effect is a low delta metric at high volatility. Among all the instruments, 
options have the largest delta/value change because of its inherent risk.
Although NQSO outperforms ISO in both efficiency and delta metrics because of 
favorable tax deduction rules in the US, NQSO lost its incentives advantage under 
the UK tax rule. Figure 3.5 reports same metrics for UK tax system. EMI/CSOP 
is the UK equivalent of ISO that gives the employee favorable tax, similar to ISO in 
the US. UOP has its US equivalent NQSO. ER stands for entrepreneurs relief which 
is a special relief only available in the UK; under this tax scheme, employees only pay 
capital gains tax at 10%. Though the qualifying conditions for this scheme are quite 
strict, we still report results based on this scheme. Results in Figure 3.5 demonstrate
74









-  ♦ - Restricted, 7=2
-  Restricted, 7=3
ts O.t
0.4
-♦ - IS O , 7=2 
ISO, 7=3 
- - -N Q S O , 7=2
-  -  NQSO, 7=3




Figure 3.4: Delta metric . This figure plots delta metric for at-the-money ISOs. NQSOs 
and restricted stock for varying level of wealth. Plot on the left has low volatility, a = 0.3 
and plot on the right has high volatility, a = 0.5. Other parameter values are: initial stock 
price, Po = 1) 1-isk free rate, r = 0.04, time to maturity, T — 10, vesting period, Ty — 3, 
stock price return, \i — 0.04, income tax rate, 77 = 0.33, capital gains tax, t c g  — 0.15, 
corporate tax rate, rc = 0.35
how taxation can affect the effectiveness of stock options. Under the UK’s tax system, 
cash no longer provides the best value/cost ratio; restricted stock only dominates stock 
options at low wealth. When the employee has personal wealth larger than 2.5, ISO (or 
EMI/CSOP) is the most effective compensation instrument. For every pound of firm 
cost, ISO (or EMI/CSOP) also provides far greater delta than that of restricted stock. 
These results provide one explanation that most UK firms use ISO (or EMI/CSOP) up 
to their respective statutory limit.
3 .4 .4  E arly  exercise  boundary
While restricted stock is sold once vested to avoid capital gains tax (because we assume 
risky stock has return equal to riskless asset), stock options are held much longer after 
the vesting date. The flexibility of the model allows us to easily investigate the exercise 
boundary for different compensation options. Figure 3.6 plots the exercise boundary of 
NQSOs and ISOs with different wealth levels and different time to expiration. When 
liquid wealth is high, at W  =  3, the ISO is exercised earlier than that of NQSO because
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Figure 3.5: Efficiency and delta metric, the UK case. This figure plots efficiency 
and delta metric for at-the-money ISOs (or EMI/CSOP in the UK), NQSOs (or unapproved 
option scheme) and restricted stock. ER, (entrepreneurs relief) is special tax scheme that 
provides qualifying employees with capital tax rate of 10%. UK tax rate are: income 
tax rate, t j  = 0.5, capital gains tax, t c g  — 0.28, corporate tax rate, rc = 0.28. Other 
parameter values are: initial stock price, P0 = U risk free rate, r = 0.04, time to maturity,
T  = 10, vesting period, TV = 3, stock price return, — 0.04, a = 0.3.
the employee expects to hold stock from exercising ISO for another year, as shown in 
Figure 3.7. Stocks (from high wealth state, W > 0.75) are held until one year has 
elapsed.
When liquid wealth is low, at W = 0.15, ISO and NQSO are exercised in almost 
the same way. Their exercise boundaries are almost identical. This is because at low 
wealth, the employee becomes very risk averse and impatient. She simply forgoes the 
tax benefits from ISO and exercises as if it was a NQSO. Results in Table 3.2 and 3.3 
also suggest that ISOs are treated as NQSOs. For example, when 7  =  4, W  = 0.25 and 
cr =  0.3, both ISO and NQSO have the same value, 0.083. Their expected exercise time 
is the same too, at 6.032. This raises the question -  why grant risk averse employees 
ISOs which cost the issuing firm a large sum but are treated by the employee as NQSOs? 
The firm can simply grant NQSOs instead which achieves the same level of retention 
as of ISOs.
When liquid wealth is moderately low, for example at W = 0.5, the employee is not 
very risk averse. ISO values are higher than that of NQSO, so that holding the ISO
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Figure 3.6: Option exercise boundary. The figure plots option exercise boundary at 
both time and wealth dimension. Options are always exercised above the exercise boundary. 
Parameter values are: initial stock price, Pq = 1, risk free rate, r = 0.04, time to maturity, 
T  =  10, vesting period, TV = 3, stock price return, /x = 0.04, stock price volatility, a = 0.3, 
income tax rate, tj = 0.33, capital gains tax, tcg — 0-15, corporate tax rate, rc — 0.35.
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Figure 3.7: Stock selling boundary. The figure plots stock sell boundary at both time 
and wealth dimension. Parameters are those of Figure 3.6. Stocks are always sold below 
the selling boundary.
longer leads to a higher terminal utility. ISO is held longer even though the employee is 
fully aware that she is holding stocks from exercising ISO one more year. These results
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suggest that the company should grant ISOs to a relatively low risk averse employee 
and NQSOs to high risk averse employees.
Table 3.3: Expected exercise time of options. Expected exercise time are computed 
based on equation (3.40). Parameter values are: initial stock price, Pq  = 1, risk free rate, 
r = 0.04, time to maturity, T  = 10, vesting period, Ty — 3, stock price return, p, = 0.04, 
income tax rate, 77 = 0.33, capital gains tax, tcg — 0.15, corporate tax rate, rc = 0.35.
CO0IIb 10dIIb
Wealth Wealth
0.25 0.5 1 2 5 0.25 0.5 1 2 5
7
2 6.888 7.391 7.924 8.446 9.106 7.026 7.383 7.788 8.227 8.656
3 6.329 6.950 7.553 8.079 8.783 6.691 7.046 7.483 7.896 8.435
ISO 4 6.032 6.622 7.261 7.825 8.561 6.498 6.859 7.237 7.683 8.303
5 6.014 6.333 6.926 7.657 8.410 6.437 6.697 7.075 7.530 8.169
6 5.712 6.287 6.756 7.506 8.303 6.338 6.681 7.011 7.413 8.072
2 6.852 7.365 7.941 8.525 9.239 7.026 7.383 7.787 8.204 8.718
3 6.329 6.899 7.465 8.104 8.913 6.691 7.046 7.483 7.896 8.465
NQSO 4 6.032 6.622 7.168 7.806 8.675 6.498 6.859 7.237 7.683 8.289
5 6.014 6.333 6.926 7.599 8.509 6.437 6.697 7.075 7.530 8.166
6 5.712 6.287 6.756 7.415 8.391 6.338 6.681 7.011 7.413 8.072
Figure 3.7 plots the stock sale boundary of ISOs. Stock obtained from exercising 
NQSOs is always sold immediately. As explained previously, NQSO is taxed at exercise 
(and at income tax rate), which also moves the tax base to the current stock price. It 
is optimal to sell once exercised to avoid capital gains tax. On the other hand, stock 
obtained from exercising ISOs is only sold early when the stock price is sufficiently 
high and the employee has low wealth. For example, when wealth is 0.25, stock from 
early exercised ISOs is held slightly longer. As wealth increases, stock is held longer. 
When wealth is high enough, stock from exercising ISOs is always sold after the one 
year period to avoid higher income tax rate. This explains why ISOs are exercised 
earlier than NQSOs at high wealth. As stocks from ISOs are held for another year, the 
employee exercises the option early to offset the additional waiting before selling the 
stock.
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Figure 3.8: Income tax effect. The figure plots value to cost ratio with varying level 
of income tax rate for all four compensation instruments -  Non-qualified stock option 
(NQSO), incentive stock option (ISO), restricted stock and restricted stock with 83b elec­
tion. Restricted stock is based on initial stock price of Pq  = 1. The left plot uses wealth, 
W — 0.5 and the plot on the right uses wealth, W  = 1. Parameter values are: initial stock 
price, Po = 1, risk free rate, r = 0.04, time to maturity, T — 10, vesting period, Ty = 3, 
stock price return, jj, = 0.04, stock price volatility, a = 0.3, capital gains tax, tcg = 0.15, 
corporate tax rate, rc = 0.35.
3 .4 .5  T ax effect
Using assumptions outlined in section 3.2.3, we compare the tax effect on efficiency of 
compensation instruments. Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 plot efficiency ratios with a varying 
level of employee’s income tax, corporate tax and capital gains tax rate. While varying 
one tax rate, we keep the other two tax rates fixed at the benchmark rates which are 
77 =  0.33, tc =  0.35, tcg = 0-15.
3.4.5.1 Incom e tax
Holding the corporate tax and capital tax constant, we plot the efficiency ratio with 
varying levels of income tax. Similar to Graham [2003], who argues that NQSO is 
preferred over ISO when the corporate tax rate is higher than the income tax rate, 
NQSO is preferred when income tax is higher than corporate tax rate. However, our 
result suggests that for NQSO to be preferred, income tax rate has to be substantially 
higher (almost twice) than the corporate tax rate. The magnitude is different from
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Figure 3.9: Corporate tax  effect. The figure plots value to cost ratio with varying 
level of corporate tax rate for all four compensation instruments -  Non-qualified stock 
option (NQSO), incentive stock option (ISO), restricted stock and restricted stock with 
83b election. Restricted stock is based on initial stock price of Pq  = 1. Parameter values 
are those outlined in Figure 3.8. The left plot uses wealth, Wo - 0.5 and the plot on the 
right use wealth, Wq = 1.
our intuitive result outlined in section 2, because early exercise delays the tax liability. 
When income tax is 100%, NQSO is simply worth nothing since all value of the stock is 
taxed away. The ISO, however, is not affected by change of income tax. When income 
tax is low, it is optimal to sell the stock (which is obtained by exercising the option) 
early since income tax is lower than capital gains tax. As income tax increases, this 
early selling advantage disappears. It is then always taxed at the capital gains rate, so 
that the efficiency of an ISO stays constant and eventually becomes advantageous to 
NQSO.
Restricted stock with an 83b election has efficiency lower than 0, because it is 
double taxed at both income and capital gains tax rate. For example, when income tax 
is 100%, the employee with restricted stock and 83b election has to pay 100% of the 
stock price at grant date, so she values the stock at zero. Subsequent sale of the stock 
is taxed again at a capital gains rate which means the value of the stock is lower than 
zero. W ith the effect of risk aversion and vesting, its value should be worth even less.
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Figure 3.10: Capital gains tax effect. The figure plots value to cost ratio with varying 
level of capital gains tax rate for all four compensation instruments -  Non-qualified stock 
option (NQSO), incentive stock option (ISO), restricted stock and restricted stock with 
83b election. Restricted stock is based on initial stock price of Pq  = 1- Parameter values 
are those outlined in Figure 3.8. The left plot uses wealth, Wo = 0.5 and the plot on the 
right use wealth, Wo = 1.
3.4.5.2 Corporate tax
Since firms receive deductions for granting NQSOs and restricted stock, efficiency goes 
to infinity when the corporate tax rate equals 1. At this point the issuance cost of 
compensation is zero. ISOs are not eligible for tax deduction; their efficiency ratio 
stays constant with every level of corporate tax.
3.4.5.3 Capital gains tax
Restricted stock and NQSO are not affected by the level of capital gains tax. This is 
because holding stock is not optimal (stock offers same rate of return as that of the 
riskless asset) so that stocks are always sold once vested (or obtained by exercising). 
Efficiency of restricted stock with 83b election drops as capital gains tax increases, since 
capital gains tax is charged at difference of grant price and sale price. This makes the 
value of 83b elected stock drop with the capital gains tax rate. ISOs’ efficiency drops 
when the capital gains tax rate is low, and stays constant when capital gains tax is 
high. This is because prematurely selling stock (which is obtained from exercising ISO)
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Figure 3.11: Tax preference. The figure compares value to cost ratios of four com­
pensation instruments -  ISO, NQSO, restricted stock, restricted stock with 83b election. 
Based on value to cost ratio, above the boundary line, ISO is always preferred. Below it, 
restricted stock is always preferred. NQSO and 83b are not shown in the graph because 
they are dominated by either ISO or restricted stock. Figure 3.12 has more details on this 
issue. The left plot uses initial wealth Wq = 0.25 and the right plot uses initial wealth 
M'o = 5. Other parameter values are those outlined in Figure 3.8, capital gains tax, tcg is 
0.15.
attracts income tax; when capital gains tax is low selling stock early is not optimal, 
stock is always held after one year to get a lower tax rate. As the capital gains increases, 
this late sale premium drops and eventually disappears. So stock is always sold early 
to be taxed at a. lower income tax rate.
3.4.5.4 Tax preference
Figure 3.11 compare value to cost ratio of all compensation instruments in a in­
come/corporate tax space. On the upper left corner of both plots, ISO is preferred 
with higher value to cost ratio. This is because income taxes on ISOs can be avoided 
by selling stock early, in which case it is taxed at capital gains tax. That is why ISO 
has high value to cost ratio even though income tax rate is 100%. Restricted stock 
is preferred in the lower right corner as its value to cost ratio dominates that of both 
NQSO and 83b elected stock. This result is expected as our previous discussion in 
section 3.2.3 shows that restricted stock is always preferred to NQSO. Stock with 83b
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Figure 3.12: ISO and NQSO preference. The figure compares value to cost ratios of 
ISO and NQSO with varying level of corporate tax and income tax. Based on value to cost 
ratio, above the preference boundary, ISO is always preferred. Below it, NQSO is always 
preferred. The Graham Line is the well known result from Graham et al. [2004], which 
argues that when corporate tax rate is higher than income tax rate, NQSO is preferred to 
ISO. This argument is demonstrated in equation (3.2). The left plot uses initial wealth 
Wo = 0.25 and the right plot uses initial wealth Wq — 5. Other parameter values are those 
outlined in Figure 3.8, capital gains tax, tcg is 0.15.
election is not preferred either as our discussion in the later section shows that 83b 
election is never optimal.
The right plot in Figure 3.11 shows the same results but with high level of wealth. 
The boundary line that delineates the two regions shifts down, because of the wealth 
effect on the employee’s valuation which increase options’ value to cost ratio. A similar 
wealth effect is also observed in Figure 3.12, which compares ISO and NQSO in the 
same tax space. This figure demonstrates our earlier claim that NQSOs can be preferred 
even if the income tax rate is substantially higher than the corporate tax rate. As the 
left plot in Figure 3.12 shows NQSO is preferred even though income tax is twice 
corporate tax. There is a large derivation from the conventional argument suggested in 
Graham et al. [2004], which argue that NQSO is preferred to ISO when corporate tax 
rate is higher than the income tax rate. Such a derivation exists due to the employee’s 
risk aversion. As the right plot in Figure 3.12 shows when wealth level is high, the 
preference boundary converges back to The Graham Line.
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From a simple analysis of this section, it seems ISOs’ efficiency is less sensitive to 
the changes of tax rate, but more sensitive to change of wealth (or risk aversion). In 
fact, both ISO s value and cost are insensitive to tax changes. Section 83b election can 
result in negative values to the employee because of double taxation.
3.4.6 Stock  or options: a principal-agent argum ent
The on-going debate about the optimal mix of compensation package has tilted toward 
stock in recent years as documented in Conyon et al. [2011]. One explanation that 
the empirical literature offers is mandatory expensing of options, which disarms the 
options’ tax and accounting advantage. Dittmann and Maug [2007] argue that stock 
is the optimal form of compensation even though options offer a higher incentive per 
dollar of cost. The reason for this is that the employee values options at far lower 
price than the market does; in order to provide the same level of compensation to
the manager, options actually cost more to the firm. This result holds well in a one-
period principal-agent model, where participation and incentive constraints have to be 
satisfied. Their results hold well under the US tax rules. But under the UK tax rules, 
as we show next, ISO is the best form of compensation,
To demonstrate the problem, we use a numerical example similar to Dittmann 
and Maug [2007]. In a standard principal-agent setting, the employee only works if the 
compensation offered exceeds her reservation utility, which is known as the participation 
constraint. In addition, the contract has to incentivize her action, which evokes the 
incentive compatibility constraint. Since we make no assumption about the employee’s 
production function, we assume that the compensation contract is designed to achieve 
a certain level of incentives, I. We also assume that the reservation wage is R. This 
means compensation awarded to the employee has at least a value of R. for her to accept 
the job. So,
C(m, n, P, W)  +  m( 1 -  rf ) = R  (3.48)
A ( m ( l - r T) ,n ,P ,W )  = I  (3.49)
where n  denotes number of stock or options awarded to the employee, and m  denote 
the amount of cash salary awarded to the employee. And C(m,n,  P ,W )  is the value
3.4 Results and discussion
Table 3.4: Incentive effect of compensation contract. This table reports different 
compensation contracts that provide the employee the same level of value and delta. The 
compensation contract consists of number of stocks or options (n) and amount of fixed wage 
(m) paid, n and rn are obtained by keeping A and value (of the employee) at fixed levels; 
him cost then computes accordingly. For convenience of comparison, the fixed levels A and 
value are chosen to be that of 5 ISOs (n = 5) plus fixed wage of 5 (m = 5), then total value 
of the compensation is computed based on, Value = Ciso(ra(l -  r/), n, X , W) + (1 -  rr)m. 
Incentives are merely that of, A(m(l —7 7), n, V, IV). Other combinations of compensation 
contracts are obtained by varying n and m so that all compensation contracts have the 
same incentives and value, rn amount oi fixed wage has two effects 011 the employee’s 
valuation: firstly, it increases the employee’s value by (I — r/)m, this is the riskless part 
of her compensation. Secondly, it increases the employee’s valuation of ESO or restricted 
stock because the employee s wealth is increased by (1 — 77)77?. which affects her valuation of 
all risky instruments. Firm cost is computed based on, FCusi = F(m, n, X , W) + (I rc )m.
n  a. 4.- - i n  1 0 ( m ( l - T i ) , n , X , W , 0 )Retention is defined:  Parameter values are those of Figure 3.6.
Wealth 0.25 0.5 1 2 5
Fixed A 1.758 1.791 1.851 1.953 2.170
Fixed value 4.380 4.403 4.444 4.514 4.663
Panel A: Restricted stock
n 3.110 3.153 3.232 3.362 3.628
rn 3.749 3.735 3.707 3.653 3.571
Firm Cost 4.458 4.477 4.510 4.560 4.679
Retention 0.673 0.670 0.665 0.658 0.641
Panel B: Incentive stock option
n 5 5 5 5 5
m 5 5 5 5 K0
Firm Cost 5.654 5.657 5.663 5.673 5.690
Retention 1.361 1.366 1.361 1.368 1.416
Panel C: Non qualified stock option
n 5.605 5.625 5.660 5.719 5.838
m 4.988 4.989 4.990 4.991 4.994
Firm Cost 4.988 4.994 5.006 5.041 5.096
Retention 1.575 1.580 1.567 1.565 1.603
Panel D: Restricted stock with 83b election
n 3.731 3.777 3.858 3.986 4.228
m 3.659 3.640 3.605 3.549 3.449
Firm Cost 4.804 4.821 4.851 4.898 4.990
Retention 0.625 0.622 0.618 0.612 0.601
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Table 3.5: Incentive effect of compensation contract, the UK case. Tax rates for 
the UK are: income tax rate, 77 = 0.5, capital gains tax, tcg = 0.28, corporate tax rate, 
tc = 0.28. Other parameter values are the same as those of 3.6. EMI/CSOP is the UK 
version of ISO. Unapproved option scheme is the UK version of NQSO.











































































3.4 Results and discussion
of the compensation instruments given m, n, P  and W.  The employee’s valuation is a 
function of cash and the number of stocks or options awarded, as both m  and n  change 
the employee’s liquid wealth. Following the same logic, A (m (l -  r / ) ,n ,P ,  W)  is also 
a function of m  and n. This requires making a slight adjustment to the original model 
to include m  and n. The firm cost is computed once m  and n are determined.
Equation (3.48) is the participation constraint and equation (3.49) is the incentive 
compatibility constraint. It is worth noting that this is not strictly a principal-agent 
model, as the value and incentives of restricted stock and options changes dynamically 
with time and stock price. A continuous-time principal agent model, where incentives 
and participation constraints are continuously adjusted, is more formal in this regard. 
Our point is very simple: the two conditions are binding at the time the compensation 
package is accepted, but not every time afterwards.
For a given level of wealth, the above two equations define a unique contract mix. 
Since all stock and options values are computed as certainty equivalent dollar amounts, 
it is straightforward to compare these results. Table 3.4 shows the compensation mix 
with different levels of wealth. The results for the US are consistent with Dittmann 
and Maug [2007], who argue that use of restricted stock is the preferred form of com­
pensation, as the firm incurs less cost for providing the same level of compensation and 
incentives.
This result, however, does not always hold in the UK. When the wealth level is 
high, options dominate restricted stock with a lower cost to the firm. This is due to a 
favorable tax treatment, higher income and lower corporate tax rates. The conclusion 
in Dittm ann and Maug [2007] is based on the US system where tax favourable options 
do not induce corporate tax deduction. Since options are always valued lower than 
restricted stock when there is no tax, unless taxes are designed to favour options, 
it is always cost efficient to reward stock. The UK results, as in Table 3.5, show 
that CSOP/EM I (or ISO) options have lower firm cost. This may partly explain why 
EM I/CSOPs are always used up to their statutory limits.
Compensation awarded loses its incentive effect once sold. It is also typical for 
firms to reward new instruments as old ones expire. As documented in the pievious 
section, the expected lifetime of restricted stock is merely equal to its vesting period, 
which provides a very limited period of retention. Stock options have an expected 
lifetime far exceeding their vesting period. Once a compensation instrument is sold, its
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incentive effects on the employee are lost. So a new one has to be awarded to retain 
and incentivize the employee. We also report retention metrics for all compensation 
instruments.
Retention is far higher for options than it is for stocks, because options have an 
expected lifetime that is far longer than stock.24 From a static one-period principal 
agent model, retention is not a problem because the contract lasts only one period. 
Taking into account the retention cost, options are the preferred form of compensation. 
Setting the contract period at 10 years, options cost as little as half that of stock 
to retain the employee (because options have retention metrics almost twice that of 
restricted stock). Under the UK system, the retention of an option is almost three 
times that of stock, suggesting stock is even more costly when retaining employees. 
This may again partly explain the popularity of stock options in startup technology 



















Figure 3.13: Section 83b election. The figure plot efficiency and delta ratio of section 
83b election. Parameter values are those outlined in Figure 3.6.
24In arriving a.t the retention measure, we make an simplifying assumption that new stock and option 
grants have the sam e expected lifetime as that previously granted. W hile restricted stock m our setting  
has the expected lifetime equal to the vesting period (there is no variation with respect to stock price 
either; in other words, it is not random), options’ expected lifetime vanes with stock, strike price, 
vesting period and maturity. Actual exercise behaviour (and eventual sale of stock) is path dependent, 
so is option lifetime.
3.5 Conclusions
3.4 .7  Section  83b election
Section 83b election has a value far lower than a standard restricted stock. This is 
due to the fact that 83b election only provides the tax saving in a particular scenario 
-  the stock price goes up in the future. This result is also consistent with McDonald 
[2003] who shows that it is generally not optimal to make 83b elections. While from a 
valuation view it is not optimal to make 83b elections, Blouin and Carter [2007] argue 
that the 83b election increases employee incentives. Our results show that 83b election 
actually decreases incentives. As Figure 3.13 shows, incentives from the 83b election 
are much lower than standard restricted stock. This is because the the 83b election 
only increases incentives when stock price goes up. When price falls, incentives go down 
for the 83b elected stock.
To show this point, we also report the results for the principal-agent argument 
shown in the previous section. The results shown in panel D of Table 3.4 support the 
fact that section 83b is not an optimal form of compensation. As for the same level 
of value and incentives, 83b election costs the firm more than the standard restricted 
stock.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter advances our understanding of the employee stock option valuation with 
an in-depth study of options under different tax schemes. None of the previous literature 
on ESO valuation has incorporated taxation, which is a deciding factor of the employee’s 
exercise decision. We introduce a simple model that incorporates tax rules on different 
compensation instruments. Based on the three metrics introduced, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of different compensation instruments; our result show that, in the US, 
nonqualifying stock option (NQSO) is the most efficient compensation instruments in 
terms of value, incentives and retention. We also show that ISOs are generally exercised 
earlier than NQSOs, because employees expect to hold stock (from exercising ISO) one 
more year.
Our results also show the 83b election, which accelerate income tax on restricted 
stock, is not optimal and can lead to double taxes to its recipient. Contrary to Blouin 
and Carter [2007], who argue that 83b election increases incentives, our results show
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that 83b reduces incentives. Under the election, incentives only increase in a particular 
scenario, that is when stock price goes up. Since it is difficult to know future stock 
price ex-ante, the only plausible explanation for making such election is employee over­
confidence.
Based on a similar argument in Dittmann and Maug [2007], we calibrate the after 
tax price of compensation instruments to a simple principal-agent model. Our results 
show that incentive effects alone do not justify the wide use of options in the US 
because stocks can provide the same level of incentives at lower compensation cost. 
However, options can lead to far lower retention costs to the firm; in our numerical 
example stocks cost almost twice that of options to induce employee incentives. We 
also calibrate the model based on UK tax rules. Unlike ISOs in the UK, tax favourable 
options schemes (EMI/CSOPs) provide better value, incentives and retention. Possibly 
this is one reason why those options are always used up to their respective statutory 
limit. Although tax minimization is not a main motive for an option grant (Babenko 
and Tserlukevich [2009], Graham [2003]), tax rules certainly explain the wide popularity 
of NQSOs in the US and EMI/CSOPs in the UK.
3.6 A ppendix
3.6.1 N um erical schem e
PDEs in this chapter are solved using the implicit finite difference method. We take 
equation 3.10 as an example to illustrate the numerical procedure. For convenience we 
restate the equation below,
The equation can be log transformed to make coefficient on differential term constant, 
we do this to the wealth term. So that the equation becomes,
where w — log(IV). Only wealth is transformed, as similar transformation on stock 
space needs interpolation when calculating the final price. The wealth space is dis­
St +  rW S w  + AiPSp  +  \cr2P 2SPP = 0 (3.50)




w(k) = wQ exp(kAw) for  k =  - N ,  ...0...,iV (3.52)
and wo and A w  is defined,
wo =  wmax exp (-N A w )
log ( (3.53)
2  N
wmax and wm-m are maximum and minimum of the wealth space. Since utility is not 
defined for negative wealth, wm-m is chosen to be a small value. We choose 0.01 for 
computation used in the chapter.
The stock space is not transformed, so we follow conventional scheme
-P(j) =  im in + jA P  for j  =  0, ...,M  (3.54)
and A P  is
A p  =  PmaX^j- - (3 -55)
Time space is similarly defined,
At =  % (3.56)
Jj
where M ,N ,  and L  define grid size of the problem space. Use Sjtk,i to denote each 
node on the three-dimensional space. The PDE is discretized to the following implicit 
difference equation,
Sj,k,i+1 — Sj,k,i t Sj,k+l,i ~ + »p (j)^ 'J'+1,fc,< ~
A t  2 A w 2 A P  (3>57)
1 2 1-./ -\2^j+hk,i ~ 2«Sj',fc,7: T S j - i tk,i _  q
P U ) Ap2
91
3. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION WITH TAX
At each node S j the equation has the following solution.
Sj,k ,i  =  ( +  g p u\  A t  2Aw  p u ;  2A P
\ / / n k (3-58)
1 „ 2 p /;\2S3+l,k,i +  Sj-l,fc,A /  / CT P ( j ) 2 1 \
2 a p 2 y /   ^ a p 2 + Aiy
Although this is not the full solution to the equation, the above solution can easily be 
implemented using successive-over-relaxation (SOR) for iteration. Since this is a linear 
problem with constant coefficient on wealth, SOR converge nicely. Though different 
variations of SOR can be used to increase the convergence rate and boost computation 
performance.
3.6.2 R esu lts  w ith  no taxation
When there is no taxation, our model collapses down to a simple utility-based frame­
work with no portfolio choice. Although embedding portfolio choice in the utility 
framework is a topical a,rea for ESO valuation, for example, Leung and Sircar [2009], 
Grasselli and Henderson [2009] and Carpenter et al. [2010], it is not very relevant to the 
taxation problem introduced in this chapter. In fact, our non-tax model becomes so 
simple that the only comparables come from standard Black-Scholes. This is because 
wealth in our model is invested in the riskless asset and there is no optimal portfolio 
choice which (if included) will significantly complicate the model. The main difference 
between ISO and NQSO is in their respective tax rules; if all tax rates are set to 0 
both ISO and NQSO will be valued the same. Stock obtained from exercising ISO (and 
NQSO) is also immediately sold for there is no advantage of waiting.
Ta,ble 3.6 reports ISO and NQSO value and cost; all tax rates are set to 0; vesting is 
also set to 0 so that it can be compared to Black-Scholes. Table 3.6 shows that the firm 
cost almost converges to Black-Scholes when risk aversion is low and wealth is high. 
As expected, ISO and NQSO have identical value and cost because they are essentially 
the same option when there is no tax.
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T ab le  3.6: This table reports value and cost of ISO and NQSO with no taxation and no 
vesting. Since ISO and NQSO are only different in tax terms, their values are identical (as 
well as costs) when there are 110 taxes. Parameters are: Pq =  1, risk free rate, r =  0.04, 
time to maturity, T  =  10, vesting period, Ty =  0, stock price return, /.i =  0.04, income tax 
rate, 77 =  0, capital gains tax, tcg =  0, corporate tax rate, r c =  0. W ithout taxation and 
vesting, the model collapses down to a simple utility-pricing framework, which can easily 
compared against the Black-Scholes.
cr = 0.3 a  =  0.5
Wealth Wealth
0.25 0.5 1 2 5 0.25 0.5 1 2 5
ISO value
7
1.001 0.265 0.306 0.348 0.386 0.429 0.294 0.346 0.402 0.458 0.523
2 0.187 0.235 0.285 0.335 0.392 0.198 0.254 0.317 0.382 0.464
3 0.146 0.194 0.246 0.300 0.366 0.152 0.205 0.267 0.335 0.425
4 0.121 0.167 0.219 0.275 0.347 0.125 0.174 0.234 0.302 0.396
5 0.104 0.147 0.199 0.255 0.332 0.106 0.152 0.210 0.277 0.374
6 0.092 0.133 0.183 0.240 0.321 0.093 0.136 0.192 0.258 0.358
ISO cost
7
1.001 0.474 0.482 0.489 0.492 0.493 0.564 0.588 0.608 0.625 0.641
2 0.443 0.461 0.475 0.485 0.492 0.498 0.534 0.567 0.596 0.625
3 0.422 0.443 0.463 0.478 0.489 0.464 0.499 0.537 0.573 0.611
4 0.404 0.431 0.453 0.471 0.486 0.435 0.476 0.518 0.555 0.599
5 0.393 0.422 0.444 0.465 0.483 0.418 0.461 0.499 0.541 0.588
6 0.393 0.414 0.437 0.459 0.480 0.419 0.452 0.489 0.527 0.579
NQSO value
7
1.001 0.265 0.306 0.348 0.386 0.429 0.294 0.346 0.402 0.458 0.523
2 0.187 0.235 0.285 0.335 0.392 0.198 0.254 0.317 0.382 0.464
3 0.146 0.194 0.246 0.300 0.366 0.152 0.205 0.267 0.335 0.425
4 0.121 0.167 0.219 0.275 0.347 0.125 0.174 0.234 0.302 0.396
5 0.104 0.147 0.199 0.255 0.332 0.106 0.152 0.210 0.277 0.374
6 0.092 0.133 0.183 0.240 0.321 0.093 0.136 0.192 0.258 0.358
NQSO cost
7
1.001 0.474 0.482 0.489 0.492 0.493 0.564 0.588 0.608 0.625 0.641
2 0.443 0.461 0.475 0.485 0.492 0.498 0.534 0.567 0.596 0.625
3 0.422 0.443 0.463 0.478 0.489 0.464 0.499 0.537 0.573 0.611
4 0.404 0.431 0.453 0.471 0.486 0.435 0.476 0.518 0.555 0.599
5 0.393 0.422 0.444 0.465 0.483 0.418 0.461 0.499 0.541 0.588
6 0.393 0.414 0.437 0.459 0.480 0.419 0.452 0.489 0.527 0.579
Black-Scholes 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.494 0.654 0.654 0.654 0.654 0.654
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Chapter 4
Managerial Effort and the 
Valuation of Executive Stock 
Options
4.1 Introduction
Valuation of executive stock options has been a widely researched area of finance, yet 
few studies explicitly consider the feedback effect of incentives, in which the manager’s 
action directly influences the company stock price. Managers clearly have the ability to 
influence the company stock price as, essentially, it is the purpose of granting them stock 
options. The objective of this chapter is to investigate the value and cost of executive 
stock options by explicitly introducing managerial effort into a valuation framework.
We consider a risk-averse manager whose welfare depends on the market and the 
company’s stock price. The manager is awarded with an ESO whose value depends on 
the company stock price. The manager is also restricted from trading in the company 
stock. This is essentially an incomplete market problem, since the manager cannot 
dynamically hedge her restricted position. Following the literature, the manager’s re­
stricted position is priced using a certainty equivalent approach (e.g. Lambert et al. 
[1991], Carpenter [1998], Henderson and Hobson [2009b]). Although the manager can­
not trade the company stock, she can influence stock price by exerting costly effort.
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STOCK OPTIONS
We introduce effort as an explicit choice variable for the manager. In particular, the 
manager can increase the drift rate of the stock price process by exerting effort. In ad­
dition to the ESO, the manager can invest her personal wealth in the market portfolio 
and the riskless asset. The market portfolio is the manager’s hedging vehicle, which 
she uses to partially hedge the exposure to the ESO.
It is widely accepted that executives value stock options lower than the market 
(e.g. Huddart [1994], Kulatilaka and Marcus [1994], Detemple and Sundaresan [1999], 
Meulbroek [2001]). Managers are subject to trading restrictions, which means that 
they are only rewarded for the systematic part of the total risk (because they can only 
hedge exposures by trading the market asset). Yet they are exposed to the total risk of 
the firm. Managers thus subjectively discount the option value. However, such a view 
is not entirely correct when the manager has the ability to influence the stock price. 
We show that, under certain circumstances, the effort choice can lead the manager to 
value stock options higher than the market does.
This is because managerial effort is directly priced in the company stock price 
which then feeds back into the manager’s terminal utility. These higher than market 
valuations can occur under any (or any combination) of the following circumstances: 
the manager has low wealth, the manager has low risk aversion, and the manager is 
highly skilled (from a modelling perspective, this means her effort has large impact 
on the firm’s expected return). Under these circumstances, the manager’s marginal 
utility is high and effort plays a major role in the manager’s valuation. Following these 
results, we conclude that managers in large public firms are less likely to value their 
ESO positions higher than the market does, as they are wealthy individuals and well 
compensated for their skills. On the other hand, managers in small and non-public 
firms are more likely to value their ESOs higher than the market, because they have 
low wealth and may not be appropriately compensated for their talent.
The models closest to ours are Henderson [2005] and Carpenter et al. [2010]. Hen­
derson [2005] examines ESO value and incentives in a utility maximization framework. 
She solves the problem using an exponential utility function and the solution obtained 
does not depend on personal wealth. This desirable feature is included in our model, 
as executives’ wealth is bound to impact both the ESO value and managerial effort. 
Carpenter et al. [2 0 1 0 ] solve the problem for power law utility and implement many
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variations to the original portfolio-decision model. Our model complements theirs, with 
a new feature -  managerial effort is a choice variable.
4 .1 .1  R e la te d  literature
Utility maximization in continuous time was first introduced in Merton [1969] and Mer­
ton [1971], based on the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and requires the underlying 
process to be Markovian. Pliska [1986], Cox and Huang [1989], Cox and Huang [1991], 
and Karatzas et al. [1987] extend the utility maximization problem using the martin­
gale method. Karatzas et al. [1991] and He and Pearson [1991] extend Merton’s original 
problem to an incomplete market. Adopting the martingale method, Henderson [2 0 0 2 ] 
values a contingent claim with a non-traded underlying asset. When there is no ESO, 
Merton [1969] shows that the manager maintains a constant proportion in the market 
portfolio. However when the manager has an ESO, which restricts her from trading 
the underlying company stock, she exhibits different portfolio selection behavior. In a 
similar setup, Kahl et al. [2003] show that liquidity restrictions have a major effect on 
the executive’s optimal investment. Similar continuous-time problems which involve 
non-traded stochastic income are also explored in Duffie et al. [1997], who consider an 
infinite-horizon problem with a trading constraint. Tepla [2000] employs the martingale 
approach to study the non-traded option problem with exponential utility. Henderson 
[2 0 0 2 ] solves non-traded options with general payoff function for both exponential and 
power law utility. Leung and Sircar [2009] extend Henderson’s result to a more gen­
eral framework with early exercise, vesting and exogenous job termination. Grasselli 
and Henderson [2009] extends the incomplete market problem with a multiple exercise 
feature.
In the principal-agent framework, Feltham and Wu [2001] explicitly model man­
agerial effort in a one-period model. They find that an option grant is optimal when 
the manager can influence both the drift and the risk of company stock price. As 
reviewed in the introduction of the thesis, Jin [2002] develops a single-period principal- 
agent model to examine empirical relationships between risk and incentives. Bitler 
et al. [2005] develop a principal-agent model with entrepreneurial effort and find that 
effort increases with ownership. Cadenillas et al. [2004] considei managerial effort and
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risk-taking behavior with unlevered and levered restricted stock. They find that lev­
ered stock is optimal for a skilled manager. Agliardi and Andergassen [2003] explicitly 
model managerial effort in Merton’s set up.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the model 
with non-traded assets. Section 4.3 examines the value and cost of ESO using a single 
asset model. Section 4.4 analyses the general two asset model. Section 4.5 concludes 
with possible further research.
4.2 The m odel
In this section, we model the portfolio choice of a manager who has a non-traded 
American call option. For easier exposition, we discuss the European case first where 
the option cannot be exercised before maturity. The non-traded option is awarded to 
the manager at time t = 0. It has a payoff function Ct  = {St  — K ) + at maturity t = T. 
St  and K  are company stock price at t = T  and option strike price, respectively. The 
manager is prohibited from hedging the option position; more specifically the manager 
is not allowed to trade in the company stock S. This is a traditional option with 
trading restriction. The investment set includes three assets: a riskless bond, a market 
portfolio and the company stock.
The riskless bond or money market fund B  follows
cLBt = rBfdt (4.1)
where r is the constant interest rate. The market portfolio M  follows
^  = adt + vdZtM (4.2)
where a  is the drift of the market return and u is the volatility of the market return.
Both a  and u are constant. The market risk premium is a — r and market price of
risk is A =  ^r"- The manager can trade in the riskless bond and the market portfolio. 
Although the manager is not allowed to trade in the company stock, other outside 
investors without any restriction can still trade it. Market price of the company stock
4.2 The model
has the following dynamics,
(4.3)
where constant // is the mean of stock price return without any managerial influence; 
constant a is the standard deviation of stock price return, at is manager’s instantaneous 
effort choice, observable only to the manager. 5 G (0, oo) is an exogenous constant and 
determines the impact of managerial effort on stock price. It depends upon charac­
teristics of the manager; in a similar one-period setup, Palmon et al. [2008] assume 
d of 5 can also be interpreted as managerial skill or talent, since the higher the 6 
the larger impact the effort has. The manager can improve the firm’s performance by 
exerting effort a. Effort benefits the manager with an increased stock price return, but 
it is costly for her to implement. As the manager exerts effort to increase her portfolio 
value, she also incurs the cost of such hard work. There is a trade-off between the 
benefits and cost. Assume that the cost of effort a is a function G(a). Following the 
related literature in the principal-agent model (e.g.Feltham and Wu [2001], Jin [2002] 
and Cadenillas et al. [2004]), a good candidate with increasing and convex cost for G(a) 
is quadratic. So the stock price process consists of three components -  company stock 
return, managerial effort and stock volatility. This setup is similar to the static model 
of Jin [2002]. Both and Zt are correlated Brownian motions and
where Xt  is a Brownian motion correlated with neither nor Zt- The manager can 
use market portfolio to hedge her exposure to the restricted ESO. Following Merton 
[1969, 1971], the manager’s personal wealth follows the process
where </>t is the instantaneous proportion of Wt invested in the riskless asset and 1 - f a  
is proportion invested in the market portfolio.
In a conventional equilibrium model, managers are price-taker so that effortful ac­
tions of managers have no impact on expected asset return, CAPM is a perfect example.
=  p Z t  +  y/1 -  p2X t (4.4)
dWt = rfaWtdt +  (1 -  $t)Wt — (4.5)
99
4. MANAGERIAL EFFORT AND THE VALUATION OF EXECUTIVE
STOCK OPTIONS
Much of the previous work has been done to reconcile the principal-agent model with 
the general equilibrium asset pricing model. For example, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
[1984] derived an equilibrium asset price model with effort choice in a one-period model. 
They assumed that effort increases stock expected return, and effort is a pricing factor 
of Arbitrage Pricing Theory. Ou-Yang [2005] extended the model to a continuous-time 
equilibrium model. His main results are that managers’ action impact firm expected 
return through their impact on systematic risk. We adopt a similar assumption in this 
chapter.
CAPM does not strictly hold in our model. We assume that
p -  r a — r
pa
< (4.6)
where the fraction on the left hand side is the stock’s no effort market price of risk. 
The fraction on the right hand side is the market price of risk. This inequality makes 
sure that, without the manager’s effort, the stock’s price of systematic risk is strictly 
below that of the market. However, we do not impose the following condition to enforce 
CAPM,
ll + 8a -  r = a - r  ^  ^
pa v
where the left hand side is the stock’s with effort market price of risk. Instead, we 
assume the market price of the firm follows,
p + 8 A - r _ a - r  
pa v
(4.8)
where A  is expected level of effort implied by CAPM. If the manager chooses her 
optimal effort, a = A,  then the firm’s stock is correctly priced by CAPM. Equation 
(4 .8 ) implies that there exists an equilibrium effort level, which is aggregate of effort 
levels from all firms in the market (as assumed in Ou-Yang [2005]). Our argument 
is that the firm’s price of risk depends on the manager’s effort choice, which depends 
on the manager’s skills and risk aversion. The CAPM relation does not always hold 
between the company stock and the market portfolio because of this.
“ “ This is after all a partial equilibrium model; the stock price should also be influenced by the 
manager’s com pensation which then determines the manager s effort c oice.
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We introduce effort in the model because the manager has perfect information 
about it. She uses after effort stock price to value her ESO portfolio. Even though 
shareholders cannot observe effort, their valuation does not depend on it. This is an 
elegant feature of Black-Scholes pricing formula, which completely removes expected 
return from option valuation. Since shareholders are risk neutral and can trade both 
the firm’s stock and the market, they can ignore the impact of managerial effort when 
valuing ESO position. Or in other words, shareholders’ valuation does not directly 
depend on managerial effort.26
The manager is assumed to be risk averse and have power utility function,
U(x) = ^  (4.9)
without exercise the manager’s portfolio choice is the original Merton problem with an 
option position. Her indirect utility function is,
J(W u Su t) =  max E \ u ((St  ~ K )+ + WT) -  \  [  afdi] (4.10)at,4>t L 2  JQ J
W  and S  form a joint Markov process. The integration term is accumulative cost 
(disutility) of effort. The dynamic decision problem of the manager is to optimally 
choose her effort a and proportion 0  to maximize her expected terminal utility subject 
to the dynamic budget constraint in equation (4.5). Assuming small time A I and 
t +  A t  < T, then the value function can be rewritten as
J(Wt, St, t) — m axEt[J{Wt. + AW, St + AS1, t + At)] -  -  / a2ds (4.11) 
atrft. ^ Jt
Using Ito ’s formula and Taylor’s theorem, dropping arguments in J(Wt, S t , t) and using 
subscripts to represent partial differentiation value, J  satisfies the HJB equation
max
<i>t. ,at.
-  -a?  +  Jt +  S{n + 5at)JS +  ^ s2(j2jss  +  W[r<j>t +  a ( l  -  (j>t)\Jw 
2 2 (4.12)
+  i ( l  -  (ptf v 2W 2Jww  +  (1 -  (f>t)WSvapJws = 0
26 Functionally, there is no relationship between shareholders valuation and efiort. But effort affects 
the m anager’s exercise choice, which indirectly affects shareholders valuation.
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j* _  1 _  (r ~ <*)Jw , S a p J s w  
t v 2W  J w w  2 v W  J\y w
Solving the above equation numerically is quite involved and it is left for the Appendix 
at the end of the chapter. Without the option position (or after the option position is 
exercised), there is no non-traded asset and the manager’s new objective function is,
J*(Wt ,t) =  m a x E [ U { W T)] (4.14)
4>t
The manager optimally chooses her investment portfolio to maximize terminal payoff. 
The objective function J* (W, t )  satisfies the HJB equation,
max
<i>
Once the options are exercised, effort becomes redundant as the manager will not ex­
ercise the option if exerting effort leads to higher expected terminal utility. Essentially, 
the manager is choosing between her own effort and the market effort (which is implied 
in a). So effort drops out from the valuation PDE. Optimizing over </> and bringing the 
optimal (ft* into the equation, we have the PDE
j ;  +  H>i* +  (i -  P M  w  +  \ j w w { i  -  Pt ? W  =  o (4.i6)
Prom equation 22 of Merton [1969], solution of J  should take form of
J*{Wh t) = (4-17)
where b(t) is a function of time t. Bringing the solution back into the fundamental
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PDE, b(t) should satisfy the following ordinary differential equation.
+  b(t)g +  b(t)k =  0 (4.18)
where g = r +  and k = given terminal condition J*(Wt ,T) = U(WT).
The solution of the objective function is
) ( T - t ) (4.19)
where the optimal proportion <fi* = 1 — The manager’s problem outlined above 
does not involve exercising the option position early, but the problem is already quite 
complicated to solve. In the Appendix at the end of the chapter, the same European 
problem is discretized to a one-period binomial model.
W ith the introduction of early exercise, the manager’s problem becomes a utility 
maximization with optimal stopping. Her indirect utility function is,
where Ty  is the vesting period of the ESO, r  is the optimal stopping time of the 
option. as defined in equation (4.19), is the manager’s indirect utility after
her option position is exercised. The second term in the square bracket is accumulative 
cost of effort up to the exercise time. Apart from its cost, effort is also beneficial to 
the manager. It is because St, as defined in equation 4.3, is a function of effort. The 
manager can take all the gains from effort at exercise time, as reflected in the exercise 
value term (ST- K )+ . As explained in equation (4.15), the manager can hold the option 
to receive return from her own effort (which also incurs a cost), or she can exercise the 
option to get the market effort (which is implied in the market return, a). Note the 
manager will not exercise the option if holding the option and exert effort can lead to 
higher terminal utility.
It is obvious that I{Wt,S u t) also satisfy PDE (4.12). Once it is determined, based
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on equation (4.19) the manager’s valuation is then,
-  Wq (4.21)
where U(Wo,<So) is the manager’s subjective valuation of the option, given initial 
wealth, W q and initial stock price, SQ. Since I(W t,S t,t) and J{Wu Su t) both satisfy 
the same PDE, appendix provides details on how to numerically solve for J{W U St ,t).
4 .2 .1  V a lu e  and  cost
One interesting question of managerial influence is how managerial effort affects the 
firm’s cost, as effort affects the manager’s exercise behavior which also impacts on the 
ESO cost. Following well known results (e.g. Lambert et al. [1991], Carpenter et al. 
[2 0 1 0 ]), the cost of option can be represented as the risk-neutral expectation of the 
riskless discounted option payoff:
where E Q is expectation taken with respect to the risk neutral probability measure; r  
is the manager’s optimal exercise policy. Using Ito’s lemma, cost of option C should 
satisfy the following PDE;
where managerial effort does not directly enter into this PDE. But equation (4.12) and 
(4.23) are solved simultaneously where optimal exercise policy from equation (4.12) are 
fed into equation (4.23). The key feature of this setup is that managerial effort actually 
affects firm cost of ESO.
C = E q e~rT(Sr -  K )+ (4.22)
Ct + rSCs + \ s 2a2Css + rW Cw + \ w 2( 1 -  <t>?v2Cww 
4 - pcrvSW (1  — (p)Csw — rC = 0
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Table 4.1: Value and cost of ESO for the single asset case. All ESOs are at-the-money 
with stock price 5 = 1, and strike price K  == 1 . 7  is the manager’s risk aversion, a is 
stock volatility, 5 is measure of managerial skill. Other parameter values are: interest rate 
r  = 0.03, stock return n = 0.03, wealth W = 2. Vesting period, Tv = 3. The results 
are obtained by numerically solving equation 4.24. Details of the numerical scheme are in 
the Appendix. Maximum firm cost of ESOs are: 0.369 for a = 0.2 and 0.702 for a = 0.6. 
Maximum cost is computed using equation 4.24 but with cost-maximizing exercise strategy.
0  — 0 . 2 a = 0 . 6
7 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: ESO value
5
0 0.223 0 . 2 0 2 0.184 0.170 0.158 0.292 0.232 0.193 0.165 0.145
0.5 0.316 0.225 0.193 0.173 0.160 0.313 0.237 0.195 0.166 0.145
1 0.926 0.332 0 . 2 2 1 0.183 0.163 0.388 0.254 0 . 2 0 0 0.168 0.146
1.5 1.929 0.577 0.280 0 . 2 0 1 0.170 0.581 0.284 0.208 0.170 0.147
2 2.953 0 . 8 8 6 0.380 0.229 0.179 1.019 0.335 0 . 2 2 0 0.174 0.148
Panel B: ESO cost
S
0 0.315 0.300 0.290 0.281 0.273 0.577 0.556 0.540 0.530 0.518
0.5 0.360 0.314 0.293 0.283 0.274 0.584 0.556 0.540 0.530 0.521
1 0.369 0.352 0.308 0.288 0.275 0.609 0.563 0.541 0.531 0.522
1.5 0.369 0.366 0.332 0.297 0.280 0.653 0.572 0.547 0.532 0.522
2 0.369 0.368 0.350 0.309 0.284 0.685 0.586 0.549 0.532 0.523
Panel C: Initial effort
6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0.077 0.028 0 . 0 1 2 0.005 0 . 0 0 2 0.042 0.014 0.005 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1
1 0.150 0.059 0.024 0 . 0 1 0 0.004 0.095 0.030 0 . 0 1 1 0.004 0 . 0 0 2
1.5 0.141 0.074 0.035 0.015 0.006 0.162 0.047 0.017 0.007 0.003
2 0 . 1 2 0 0.070 0.042 0 . 0 2 0 0.009 0.204 0.065 0.023 0.009 0.004
4.3 A  single asset case
The problem is generally complicated since the manager is allowed to trade market port­
folio. We first consider the simple case where the manager cannot make the portfolio- 
choice. In this simple case, the manager is rewarded with the stock option and her
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Figure 4.1: Value and cost with single asset model. This figure plots subjective 
value and firm cost of ESO with different stock prices. In the left plot, 5 is set equal to 1. 
In the right plot, 7  is set equal to 4. Volatility, a is set equal to 0.2 for both plots. Other 
parameter values are the same as Table 4.1
outside wealth is invested in the riskless asset. For this simple one-asset case, we also 
assume that /t =  r, so that the risk premium of the stock is purely contributed by 
managerial effort, 5a. This is to make sure that the manager wants to hold the option 
longer only because of her positive effort choice, but not because of higher value of /i so 
that the natural advantage of the option over the riskless asset is removed, otherwise 
the manager would choose to hold the option longer (to extract positive drift f i—v) even 
though she is not exerting effort.27 Using a similar argument based on HJB equation, 
the manager’s valuation PDE is then,
Jt +  i iSJs  +  \ 5 2S2{Js ?  +  ^ 2S 2Jss  =  0 (4.24)
where 5 is a measure of the manager’s skill, and the third term comes from the manager s 
optimal effort choice. We report results for the single asset case in Table 4.1.
Obviously, there are a few cases where the manager’s subjective value is higher than 
the firm cost. These cases occur when the manager is very skilled (high value of 5) and 
not very risk averse (low value of 7 ) and the stock has a relatively low volatility. When
"" 27Such an argument is also valid under the conventional setup where the manager has no effort choice.
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Wealth, W Volatility, a
Figure 4.2: Value and cost with other parameters. This figure plots subjective 
value and firm cost of ESO with different risk aversion, 7 , managerial skills, (5, wealth, W 
and volatility, a. Other parameter values are the same as Table 4.1
these conditions are not satisfied, ESO values are still lower than the firm’s cost. For 
example, when volatility is 0 .2 , the value is larger than cost only when 8 is larger than 
1. This is a very large value of 8, as initial effort under this scenario is around 12% 
which is almost three times that of the interest rate. The stock drift with managerial 
effort is almost 25%. Although talented managers can significantly improve the value 
of a company, such a high return for a publicly listed company is very rare, certainly 
not for every manager. Cadenillas et al. [2004] make a reasonable assumption that 8 
is 0.05. Under this assumption, our model shows that reported ESO subjective values 
are strictly lower than their respective firm cost.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate the point that the value is only higher than the 
cost when managerial skill is extremely high. The value is increasing and unbounded 
in (5, and it is infinity when 8 goes to infinity. As this is a partial equilibrium model 
where there is no endogenous compensation, value can go to infinity while holding other
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exogenous variables fixed. For example, wealth is held fixed in both Figure 4 . 1  and 4 .2 . 
Ideally, a skilled manager is compensated more, which increases the manager’s wealth 
and brings down her subjective value, so that the infinite value is never realized.
4.4 The general model
W ith the market asset, the problem becomes more involved. In order to have tractable 
results for the portfolio optimization problem, many previous contributions assume 
exponential utility function (e.g. Henderson [2005]). Carpenter et al. [2010] assume 
constant relative risk aversion utility and solve the problem using the finite difference 
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Figure 4.3: ESO value and cost with varying correlation. This figure plots value 
and cost for various correlation, p and managerial talent, 6. The plot on the left has low 
volatility at a = 0.3, the plot on the right has high volatility at a = 0.5. Wealth, W = 0.6. 
Parameter values are those of Table 4.2.
One major addition that the two asset model offers is correlation between the stock 
and the market. This section focuses on the effect of correlation. Similar to the previous 
model with the market asset, the correlation has a significant impact on the executive s 
valuation (see Figure 4.3). As the correlation increases, the manager can increasingly 
hedge her ESO position using the market asset. The ESO position becomes increasingly 
similar to a traded option, so both the value and the cost of ESO increase with the
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Figure 4.4: Initial effort and correlation. This figure plots initial effort varying level 
of correlation. The plot on the left has low volatility at cr = 0.3, the plot on the right has 



















Figure 4.5: Initial effort and wealth. This figure plots initial effort with varying level 
of stock price and wealth. Correlation, p = 0.5. The left plot has wealth, W = 0.6. The 
right plot has stock price, S = 1. Other parameter values are those of Table 4.2.
correlation. In addition to the value and cost reported, Figure 4.4 shows the initial 
managerial effort^ for different levels of correlation, p. Effort also increases with p\ this 
28Effort is path dependent, Figure 4.4 only reports effort level when ESOs are granted.
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Table 4.2. Value and cost of ESO for the two asset case. All ESOs are at-the-money 
with stock price S = 1, and the strike price K  = 1 . a is stock volatility, 5 is measure 
of managerial skill. The manager has risk aversion, 7  = 2 . Other parameter values are: 
interest rate r = 0.03, market asset return, a = 0.08, market asset volatility, v = 0.2. 
Option has maturity, T  = 10 years and vesting period , Ty — 3. Stock return is assumed 
to be p = r + k(^-^po^j, where 0 < k < 1 , to make sure no effort stock return is lower 
than that implied by CAPM. k is set to 0.9 for results in the table.
a  =  0.3 (7 = 0.5
p 0 0 . 2 0.5 0.7 0.9 0 0 . 2 0.5 0.7 0.9
ESO value, IV =  0 . 6
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ESO cost, IV =  1.2
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is because with high value of p the manager can increasingly hedge her ESO position. 
So she delays the value destroying early exercise and replies 011 effort to increase her 
terminal expected utility. As a result, value also increases with correlation.
The ESO cost does not converge to maximum value (which is equal to the Black- 
Scholes value) when p goes to 1. This is because the manager has to keep her wealth
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Figure 4.6: Early exercise boundary, low volatility case. This figure plots exercise 
boundary for various correlations, p and managerial talent, 8, volatility is a — 0.3. Wealth 






























Figure 4.7: Early exercise boundary, high volatility case. This figure plots exercise 
boundary for various correlations, p and managerial talent, <5, volatility is cr = 0.5. Wealth 
is W = 0.6. Other parameter values are those of Table 4.2.
positive to prevent expected utility from going to the negative infinity. As Carpenter 
et al. [2 0 1 0 ] points out, the manager is essentially solving the problem with a non-
”  29T his is a similar problem to that of Chapter 2, where power law utility function gives the negative 
infinity when wealth is negative.
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negativity constraint 011 wealth. For cost to converge to the Black-Scholes, a.n additional 
condition is needed. That is, the manager has to be risk neutral, which removes the 
non-negativity constraint from the problem.
The effect of effort on both the value and the cost is very marginal (see Figure 4.3). 
Numerical results are reported in Table 4.2. First, it is obvious to see the effect of 
effort. Both value and cost increases with managerial talent, 5. The problem, however, 
is the magnitude of the difference. For example, when p = 0.5, a =  0.5 and W  =  0 .6 , 
a 10 times increase in managerial skill (from 5 =  0.01 to 0.1) only results in a less than 
1 % increases in value (from 0.268 to 0.270) and an even smaller increase in the cost 
(from 0.529 to 0.530).
This result is due to the manager’s wealth, which affects the manager’s marginal 
utility and effort level. Figure 4.5 shows the effort level with varying levels of stock 
price and wealth. Effort is largest when wealth is lowest. In other words, effort has the 
largest impact on value when wealth is relatively low, although values at low wealth 
(as reported in Table 4.2) are lower than values at high wealth. This is because the 
wealth effect dominates the effort effect, so that the value increases with wealth. Figure 
4.5 also reports the initial effort with varying levels of stock price. Effort reaches its 
maximum with stock price equal approximately twice the strike price, then gradually 
diminishes. Effort also has a large impact on value when the stock price is higher than 
the strike price; still, it does not guarantee that the value would be higher than the 
cost as the wealth effect dominates in the manager’s valuation.
In addition to the value and the cost, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 report the optimal exercise 
boundary for various levels of correlation and managerial skill.30 Higher correlation 
indicates that the manager can increasingly hedge her ESO positions so that she would 
hold options longer. The differences between p — 0 and p =  0.9 are quite large, but the 
exercise boundary does not go to infinity (which implies the manager never exercises 
ESOs early) as p goes to 1. The reason is already mentioned above: it is a constraint 
that is imposed by the utility function. For the exercise boundary to go to infinity, the 
manager has to be risk neutral. Managerial skills, 5, on the other hand, have only a 
marginal impact on the exercise boundary. This is also confirmed by numerical results
30We report only results for positive correlations for one reason. Our setup allows only P ^ * iv e  
and effort increases stock price of risk, A negative correlation means the stock has negative
risk premium and effort has to  be negative to increase stock price of ris .
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in Table 4.2. 6 has a similar impact on the value and exercise boundary as that of the 
stock price return, as high 5 results in high effort choice which increases return of the 
stock .31
4.5 D iscussion and conclusion
In this chapter, we build a continuous time utility model to value ESOs under the 
explicit assumption that the manager has the ability to influence the stock price. The 
traditional view that ESOs are valued lower than the Black-Scholes valuation does not 
always hold. By explicitly considering the manager’s ability (effort), we show that a 
risk averse manager can value ESOs more highly than the market. These higher than 
market valuations occur under certain cases: when the manager is not very risk averse, 
or when she has low wealth, when she is highly skilled, or when the stock has low 
volatility. Under these scenarios, the manager’s marginal utility is high and effort has 
a large impact on the manager’s valuation.
However, in a general equilibrium model (or in an efficient competitive market) 
where skilled talents are appropriately rewarded, highly skilled managers are likely to 
be paid with large sums of fixed wage, which raises their wealth and reduces their 
risk aversion. In this case, effort has an impact on valuation but not large enough to 
significantly change exercise behavior, nor would effort make the manager’s valuation 
higher than that of the market.
The practical implications of these results are as follows. Managers from large public 
firms are less likely to value their ESOs higher than the cost. Because of competition 
they are rewarded with large amounts of fixed wages which substantially raises their 
wealth level. Skilled managers are also likely to be paid more, which also reduces 
their valuation. On the other hand, managers of small non-public firms are likely to 
value their ESOs far higher than their cost, as they are not paid with large fixed wage. 
They may not have large outside wealth either. Competition for these positions is 
less intense, which implies that skilled managers may not be rewarded more than their 
peers. All these factors increase the manager’s valuation. These results may paitly
31 We report results for a small range~of <5, because the single asset example already demonstrates 
that value (cost is bounded by Black-Scholes) is unbound in 8. Such results also hold in the two assets 
case.
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explain why ESOs are so popular in startup firms, where managers are most likely to 
value ESOs higher than the market. It also offers an explanation of why empirical 
research (for publicly traded firms) finds mixed relationship between ESO incentives 
and firm performance. This may be due to managerial effort having a limited impact 
on firms’ stock price.
Finally, a natural extension of this chapter would be to incorporate the sharehold­
ers’ problem in the model. One possible formulation of such problem would be treating 
the shareholders’ objective as a static maximization, similar to that outlined in Chap­
ter 3. Shareholders optimally choose number of ESOs rewarded to the manager, in 
order to maximize firm value (net cost of options position) at option expiry date. The 
maximization takes into account reservation and incentive constraints, but it would be 
difficult to make both constraints binding throughout the ESOs’ lifespan. A simplified 
assumption would be to make both constraints only binding at the grant date (as shown 
in Chapter 3). It would be very interesting to see how ESOs are valued under such a 
model, since shareholders have an impact on the manager’s effort choice and her ESO 
valuation.
4.6 A ppendix
4 .6 .1  A  b in o m ia l tre e  exam ple
Based on the European framework outlined in the model, we can find the cash amount 
(or certainty equivalent) that the manager is willing to receive in exchange for the 
position in stock option. Following Lambert et al. [1991], Carpenter [1998] and Hall 
and Murphy [2002], the CE amount is simply the amount which makes the manager 
indifferent between receiving riskless cash and accepting the risky ESO. Solving for the 
CE in a continuous framework is quite involved and is demonstrated in the next section. 
A simpler one-period binomial tree is used in this section to show the computation of 
the CE.
Consider two correlated risky assets in the market. Suppose the two assets St and 
Mt have initial value of S0 and M0, at the end of period 1 their respective values are
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with each state has equal probability | . The tree is calibrated using the parametrization 
of He [1990] with each parameter computed as follows:
All parameters are discretized directly using their continuous counterpart, e.g. =  
adt +  vdZt'1, where h =  T since this is a 1-period tree h =  T / l  =  T. The correlation 
between two diffusion terms dZf1 =  pdZt +  a/1 -  p2dXt where Xt is Brownian motion 
independent of both Z$f and Zt-
The initial wealth w =  Wo =  (f)B +  (1 -  4>)Mq. At the end of period 1, wealth is 
Wi — 4>Wq{ 1 +  r) +  (1 -  fyWop. Using the same notation as in the continuous time 
case, the option that underlying the non-traded asset St has payoff function Ct ■ For a 
call option CT =  (ST ~ K )+. Assuming the manager’s disutility function K{a) = \a 2. 
The manager’s objective under this one period model is
Where Jr(ta ,l) is objective function with non-traded call option. Similaily, J(w ,0) is
771 =  exp ah +  uVh 
i f  = exp ah -  vVh
J(iu, 1) =  supE[U(Wt  +  Ct )} -
115
4. MANAGERIAL EFFORT AND THE VALUATION OF EXECUTIVE
STOCK OPTIONS
objective function without non-traded option. The number 0 and 1 in the argument 
indicate either there is 1 option or there is 0 option. The manager’s decision problem 
is to optimally choose 4> and a to maximize her expected terminal utility. The price P  
of the non-traded option can be solved using
As stated above J(u;,0) is simply the objective function without the non-traded call 
option. P  is the price that leaves the manager indifferent (her utility being unchanged) 
between paying the price P  to receive the option, and leaving the position unhedged. 
With this simple structure, the computation of the non-traded option price is relatively 
easy. However, extending the two-periods tree to multi-periods is a daunting task. 
Musiela and Zariphopoulou [2004] investigate the incomplete binomial model; they 
propose a probabilistic iterative algorithm for a multi-periods framework.
A  n u m erica l exam ple  For the below numerical example power law utility U(x ) =  
y —^ is used and parameter values are: Sq — 1, K  =  1, Wo =  1, r =  0.03, a = 0.08, 
v =  0.2, p =  0.025, a  =  0.2, p =  0.1, T  = 1, 7  =  2, <5 =  0.1. The expected utility is
To maximize expected utility, the optimal hedge 1 -  0 and optimal effort is 0.928 and 
0.044. Using J(W 0 -  P, 1) =  J{W 0, 0), the price of the non-traded option is P  =  0.105. 
To make comparison, the market value (or firm cost) of an equivalent traded option is 
computed using 1-period Cox, Ross, Rubinstein binomial tree. P  — 0.116 is the 
price of an equivalent traded option. The non-traded stock option is worth slightly less 
than a traded option. This is because of the risk aversion and non-tradeability. Effort 
also impacts on price, but in this example 6 = 0.1 so its effect is relatively small to
J ( w - P , l )  = J(w,0)
then
J(Wo, Cq) =  max E (4.25)
make any significant difference.
32 Since the option is always exercised at the end of time 1, results from CRR model equals firm cost
of this 1-period ESO.
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4.6 .2  N um erical solution
To solve equation (4.12) numerically, we first take a log transformation. Similar to 
Carpenter et al. [2010], defining s = log(S), w =  log(W’) and f (w ,s , t )  = J (W ,S ,t ), so 
tha t
Jt =  f t (4.26)
J w  =  ^  (4.27)
T _ fwW fw ( A  O Q \
J s  =  j  (4.29)
J s s  =  (4-30)
= (431)
After this transformation, it is not difficult to see that the coefficients on linear terms 
are constant. The new PDE is
max ~  l at + ft + (/* + Sat ~  iU2)/* + + [r& + "  &)2 I  l  (432)
— (1 — 0t)2^2]/w + ~~ + (1 4>t)vcrpfws =  0
Differentiating equation (4.12) with respect (fit and at gives the following first-order 
conditions
a*t=6fs
v2 f, + (a  -  r -  v2) f w + vopfw .
h  -  v 2(fww -  /«,)
(4.33)
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Bring a*t and </>* back into equation (4.12),
ft  +  ( p -  \<?2)f ,  +  \ s 2(f , )2 +  iff2/,,,
+ [rtf + a(l -  f t )  -  i ( l  -  « ) V ] / »  (4.34)
+  2 ^  ~ + (1 -  (f>*.)vcrpfws = 0
This is a nonlinear PDE with three variables. There is no known closed-form solution. 
Some attem pts have been made in the theoretical literature to solve the problem in 
closed-form. For example, Henderson and Hobson [2002] solve the problem for expo­
nential utility with a simple payoff function Ct  = k S r , where k is a known constant. 
Henderson [2002] solve the problem for general payoff function Ct  = h(St ) using series- 
based approximation, where h(St) is a general function of St . Henderson [2005] explored 
a similar problem using exponential utility.
Following a similar argument, company cost has PDE,
Ct +  (r -  C 2)C, + C 2CSS + [r -  i ( l  -  <frl)2v2]Cw
2 2  2 (4.35)
-1- -(1  -  (f)*t )2v2Cww + (1 -  cj)*t )uapCws -  rC = 0
where (p* is given in equation 4.33. Note this equation is also log-transformed. For the 
single asset model, very similar PDEs can be derived. The manager’s valuation PDE 
follows
ft + (p. -  +  J<52 ( / s ) 2 + \ ° 2!s, =  o  (4.36)
The equation is after log-transformation, where equation (4.24) is the original equation. 
Under the single asset model, firm cost PDE is merely that of Black-Scholes, hence is 
omitted here.
4.6.3 Solu tion  m ethods: single asset model
For computational purposes, all PDEs outlined in the Appendix are log transformed. 
All PDEs are solved using the finite difference method (FDM), but detailed schemes 
are slightly different for different PDEs. We use a stable and explicit scheme called 
the alternating direction explicit (ADE) method, which is introduced in Duffy [2009].
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The prime advantages of ADE are that it is explicit (no need to solve the system of 
equations at each time step, hence great computational speed) and it is unconditionally 
stable (which most explicit methods lack).
For FDM we need firstly to define a numerical grid that represents the PDE. The 
grid values for single asset case are defined as follow,
fj,i = /( jA s ,iA t)
(4.37)
for j  =  0, ...,M  and i =
where both M  and N  are positive integers that determine the size of stock and time 
discretization. As and At are grid spacing on stock and time direction, so that fj^  is 
the grid value at grid node (j, i).
Derivatives of function at each grid node (,j , i) are then approximated as
ft = k i  (4.38)
for the time derivative, and
f  — /j+M f j - h i  (4.39)
for the first stock derivative. Second stock derivative is,
f  — /j+M  +  f j - h *  (A AH')
fss ~  (As)2  ^ ;
The single asset PDE by finite difference is then,
fj,i+1 ~ fj,i _  ,,, _ | /j’+M ~ f j - h i
At 2 I 2As
_ 1x2 (  -  / i - h A  (4.41)
2 I 2As J
1 2 (  f.i+1.« ~ +- a
2 I (A«)
This is a typical implicit approximation, so that only /j,i+i is known in the above 
equation. Because of the nonlinear term on the first stock derivative, it is not obvious
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how to solve the system of equations analytically. SOR is good choice for this mildly 
nonlinear problem, but its convergence (including its different variants) is quite slow. 
However, the problem can easily be transformed into two explicit equations, the first 
one is
At time step i, all grid values at i +  1 is known. So the explicit equation gives the 
solution,
This equation is solved from j  = M  — 1 all the way ‘down’ to j  — 1. At j  M, grid 







which can be solved similarly as,
f V .J3 liilhi -L. _ 1~2\ ( /j+M+1A f +lM 2 ^  2As J
2 I 2As




+  r-At 2 (As)2
The equation is solved from j  = 1 all the way ‘up’ to j  = M  — 1. At j  = 0, grid value 
is given by the lower boundary condition. The solution at node (i,j)  is then obtained 
by averaging the two terms
f ¥ ,  + f R
(4.46)
fV-  f D-f _  J3,1 ^  J3,i 
— o
Given the manager’s utility function, the boundary conditions mentioned above and 






n(M A s  — K )+ exp (r(N  — i)A t) +  W
fi,N =





where K  is the exercise price of the option and W  is the manager’s wealth which is 
exogenous to the model. In addition to boundary and terminal conditions, the value of 
exercising the option is,
f E =J3,1
n (jA s  -  K )+ exp (r(N  -  i)A t) +  W
1 -7
1 - 7  
E  i f  f E
(4.48)
At every node, solution f j j  is replaced with if f j j  > fj,i
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4.6 .4  Solu tion  m ethods: two asset model
The valuation PDE as outlined in previous section is highly nonlinear. Brennan et al. 
[1997] solve a similar PDE using successive-over-relaxation, but this method converges 
slowly when the solution gird becomes large. Carpenter et al. [2010] solve the problem 
using splitting methods which subdivides the PDE into two ODEs and greatly increases 
computational performance. However, splitting methods have its problem: firstly it 
creates fictional time step where boundary conditions are not known. Secondly most 
splitting methods are still implicit which mean a system of equations has to be solved at 
each time step; it is very costly to solve such systems especially when grid size becomes 
large. ADE, on the other hand, is explicit and easy to generalize to a higher dimension. 
The ADE method outlined below is conditionally stable due to explicit approximation 
of the nonlinear terms. On the other hand, the splitting method is more stable and 
yield better results. Still, ADE is faster than the splitting method. Since the splitting 
method is widely used, we only talk about the ADE method. For the two asset model, 
grid values are defined,
where wo > 0 is the lowest value of wealth on the grid; it is kept positive to make sure 
boundary conditions are well defined. For all computations in this chapter, w q  —  0.01 
is used. Derivative approximations are as follows,
f j }k,i =  /O'As, w 0 +  fcAw,iAt) 
for j  = 0, ...,M, fc =  0, and i =  0,
(4.49)
(4.50)










f _  fj,k+l,i ‘Z fjk i + f j k - u  / .~„x
lww ---------------( A ^ ------------  (4-54)
The above approximations are implicit. With explicit approximation on wealth
direction and also the mixed derivative,
f    fj,k+l,i+l
!w ~  2Aw
/• _  fj,k+U+l ~ 2fjAi+l +  /j,fe-l,t+l , .
Jww (Aw)2  ^ '
f  — fj+1’k+l,i+1 ~~ fj+l,k-l,i+l ~ fj-l,k+l,i+l +
Jws AAwAs
These explicit terms are used to linearize the PDE. Based on PDE (4.34), and difference 
approximation of derivatives, the valuation function (4.34) has the following implicit 
form,
fj,k,i+1 — fj,k,i , f 1 _2'\ | fj+l,k,i ~~ fj-l,k,i )
A t '  2 H 2As
1 z2 ( fj+ l,k,i~~ fj-l,k,i\ , 2 (fj+ l,k j_  ^fj,k,i +
2 I 2As j + 2a ( (As)2
+  [r** +  a ( l  -  r )  ~ h i  -  —  )  <4-56)
+ 1 (1 _ r )  v  + j
. ,*x / /•j+l./e+U+l -  Jj+l,k-l,i+l ~ /j-l.fc+M+l + /j-l.Ai-l.i+l | _  n
+ (!-</> ------------------------------4 A w A s J  - u
Note that <p* is approximated explicitly based on equation (4.55) where formula of (j) 
is given in equation (4.33). Mixed derivative is also tackled explicitly. After treating 
all nonlinear terms explicitly, the valuation PDE is linear. Brennan et al. [1997], Kahl 
et al. [2003] and Carpenter et al. [2010] use the same lineai ization scheme. Similai to
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the single asset case, the difference equation is transformed to two explicit equations, 
fj,k,i+l ~  Jj,k,i , ( it 1 J2,^  ( fj+l,k,i ~ fj-l,k,i+l \
Ai + U  2 2As J
^ r2  (  ~  f j - l , k , i + l  1 2 /  f j + l , k , i  ~  f j , k , i  ~  f j , k , i + 1 "t" f j —l,fc ,i+ l
2 ^ 2As /  2 \  (As)2 )
+ [r4>* +  «(1 -  4>1 ~ i ( l  -  <n2"2] ■1’12~A^ ~ 1,i+1)  <4-57)
l / i  _  a*\2 2 j fj,k+l,i ~ ~ fj,k,i+1 + fj,k-l,i+l \
2 I (Aw)2 y
, /i / /j+l,fc+l,t+l ~  /j+l.fc—l,i+l ~  / j  —l,fc+M+l +  /j-l,fc -l,i+ l | _  0
+  1 (p  )V(Tp i 4A wA s /
and
fj,k,i+l fj,k,i , ^if /j+l,fc,t+l |
At U 2 y 2As j
1 r 2  (  f j + i , k , i + l  f j  — l k  i \  ^ 2 ( / ? + ! i^,>+1 f j . k . i  f j , k , i + l  f j ~ l , k , i \
2 (  2As )  + 2a (  (A ,)* J
+  H *  + a { \  -  ~  |(1  -  «  M  (458)
+  5(1 -  * * ) V  +







-1-  ( a — - a 2 )  I  \
2 y 2As J
_u I A2 I /j+ h M  /j-l,fc,i+l 1 I 1 J2 ( fj+l,k,i ~ fj,k,i+1 + Jj-l,k,i+l \  
2 ^ 2As J  2 V ^  )
—Ci— 6*)2u2} ( fj , k-i , j+i  
2 J \ 2Aw
_j_ 1(1 _ 0*)2j/2 [ •/j.fc+M ~ Jj,k,i+1 + fj,k-l,i+l |
2  i (Aw)2 y
+ (1 -  <t>*)vap\ /j+l,fc+l,i-H ~ /j+l.fc-M+l ~ /j-l,fc+l,z+l + f j - l ,k- l , i+l 
4AwAs F (j, k, i) 
(4.59)
and
f Uj,k,i A t +  ( / * - 5<01
1^2\J /j+l,/c,z+l fj-l,k,i 
2As
1 r2 | ./j+l.fc.i+l ~ fj-l,k,i J , 1 2 j fj+l,k,i+l fj,k,i+1 + fj-l,k,i
2 2 As 2 I
+  [ r ^  +  a ( l - 0 * ) - - ( l - 0 * ) V
+  i ( i - * * ) V
v (As)2
(/j,fc+l,i+l ~ fj,k—l,i2A w
fj,k+l,i+l ~ }j,k,i+1 + fj,k—l,i 
(Aw)2
. ,*N /"/i+l.fc+l.i+l "  /j+l,fc-l,j+l ~ /j-l.fc+M+l + /j-l,fc-l,i+l
+  (l -  * ^ ( j ,  A;, i) 
(4.60)
where
1 cr2 (1 -  0*)2^2 
= a I + 2 ( A ^ +  2(A®)2
(4.61)
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Table 4.3: This table reports value and cost of ESO with no effort. The stock return 
is set to be consistent with CAPM. In order to ensure accuracy of our results, parameter 
values are chosen to be those of Carpenter, Stanton and Wallance [2010], they are: P0 = 1, 
risk free rate, r = 0.05, time to maturity, T = 10, vesting period, Tv -  2, market return, 
Ai = 0.13, market volatility, u = 0.2, initial wealth, Wq = 0.6, risk aversion coefficient, 
7  = 4. CSW value and cost are results from Table 3 of Carpenter, Stanton and Wallance 
[2010].
Volatility=0.50, Beta=1.2
Parameter Value Cost CSW value CSW cost
Panel A: Beta effects
0.0 0.158 0.424 0.158 0.425
0.5 0.166 0.429 0.166 0.430
0.9 0.180 0.439 0.180 0.440
1.2 0.196 0.450 0.197 0.451
1.4 0.211 0.460 0.210 0.460
Panel B: Volatility effects holding beta constant
0.25 0.409 0.467 0.411 0.467
0.30 0.297 0.427 0.298 0.426
0.40 0.230 0.421 0.229 0.421
0.50 0.196 0.450 0.195 0.450
0.60 0.172 0.485 0.170 0.486
Panel C: Volatility effects holding correlation constant
0.25 0.215 0.340 0.214 0.339
0.30 0.213 0.359 0.212 0.359
0.40 0.206 0.404 0.205 0.404
0.50 0.196 0.450 0.195 0.450
0.60 0.184 0.493 0.182 0.494
So the solution at node (j, k, i ) is,
f U  i f D
f  _  -C.M+ (4.62)Jj,k,i ' 2
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Given tlie manager s utility function, the boundary conditions are,
(1-7)(r + ^ 2 ^ (r~ i/U0
_  ( w q  +  kA w )1”1 
Jo,k,i---------- -----   exp1 - 7
(M As — K  +  W q + kAw)
J M , k , i  =  ------------------- —----  -1 - 7
1 -7
exp
r ( { j A s - K ^  + wo)1 7 
Jj, o . i  = ------------------------ ; ---------------------1 - 7 exp ( 1 _ 7 ) ( r + I W ( T ' iAt
({jAs -  K )+ -\-w0 + N A w )1 7 s /  ( r - o d 2 \




( ( j A s - K ^  + wo + kA w )1 7 
1 - 7 (4.64)
Finally, the exercise value is
f E  =J j ,k, i
E (O'As -  K ) + +  W q + kA w )1 7
1 -  7
exp (1 -  7 ) ( r +
(r — a )2 
2/527 ( T - z A t ) ) (4.65)
At every node, solution is replaced with f Eki  if f Eki >
For robustness check, Table 4.3 compares our results with those of Carpenter, Stan­
ton and Wallance [2010]. All results in Table 4.3 are computed based on 200 steps in 
stock price space (which range from 0 to 4), 200 steps in wealth space (which range 
from 0 to 5), and 10,000 steps in time space. The differences in our results may due to 
different treatments of boundary conditions and inter-time step boundary in the split­
ting method, which Carpenter is not explicit about (the small difference still presents 
even we increase grid size to 400 x 400 x 10,000). As Duffy [2009] suggest that inter­
time step boundary conditions of splitting methods are still poorly understood. We 
expect to have exact solutions of Carpenter’s if we impose their boundary conditions.
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Our boundary conditions are shown in equation (4.63). We also impose these boundary 
conditions on inter-time steps.
Henderson and Hobson [2009a] found that the cost valuation function C, which 
satisfies equation (4.35), is convex in wealth at some parameter values. We did not find 
any convexity in the parameters reported in this chapter. This may be due to the fact 
the numercial scheme performs relatively poorly at low wealth level, as the manager’s 
utility is negative infinity when wealth approaches zero. We fix the wealth at a finitely 
low level (it is 0.01 for all our numerical results) to cope with this problem. Carpenter 




Although chapters 2, 3, and 4 are self-contained essays that answer specific questions, 
they by no means complete our understanding of executive compensation. There are 
multiple avenues to extend findings of these chapters.
Firstly, debt in chapter 2 only has a scaling effect, which increases the firm asset base 
and magnifies managerial actions. This is a reasonable assumption for a financial insti­
tution, which uses debt to lever up investments. It may not be true for a non-financial 
firm as debt can be used for other purposes, e.g. saving corporate tax, researching new 
technology, etc. Also, the firm’s operation may not be easily scalable. A new model can 
explore this by introducing alternative interactions between debt and other firm char­
acteristics. Another possible extension is to incorporate shareholder-debtholder agency 
cost to the model, so that the model has two agency problems: shareholder-rnanager 
and shareholder-debtholder. Such a model can investigate interaction between the two 
agency relationships.
Secondly, in chapter 3 we assume that the effective tax rate is always fixed at the 
highest level. It is a rather simplified assumption made for exposition purposes. As 
the effective tax rate is a function of corporate income and deduction, relaxing this 
assumption requires full knowledge of firms’ financial information and a foiecast of
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possible future income, so that more accurate estimate of effective tax rate can be used 
in the valuation model. It is essentially a model that combines Graham et al. [2004] 
and our tax-inclusive valuation model.
Thirdly, the model in chapter 4, as most studies in the literature, is only partial. 
ESO positions are exogenously given. In an equilibrium model, both ESO position 
and managerial effort should be choice variables. It would be very interesting to make 
the model a full equilibrium one where compensation contracts, effort choice and ESO 
pricing are simultaneously determined. However, it is not obvious how such a complex 
(principal-agent) model can be easily embedded in a equilibrium one. Ou-Yang [2005] 
solves the problem for linear contracts; it is far from obvious how this can be applied 
to non-linear instruments such as options.
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